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Abstract
From the beginning of the world, the agricultural sector has always played an essential
role into our society, and contracts have massively been used by policy-makers for the
implementation of (agri)environmental policies, especially when such policies concern
the use and development of privately owned land, and information asymmetries between
policy-makers and individuals exist. Even though the majority of (agri)environmental
contracts are designed assuming individual’s constant time-preferences, recent evidence
from many behavioural studies on individual’s intertemporal choices advocate declin-
ing time-preferences due to behavioural biases, which can be explained by hyperbolic
discounting.
Therefore, in this dissertation we present a theoretical analysis of the impact of
an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual into a contract for the provision of an
(agri)environmental target, under both perfect and imperfect information. Our key find-
ing suggests that the more inconsistent time-preferences an individual has, the higher
the impact of them into contract design is, unless a commitment mechanism (perfect
information) or higher detection probability of cheaters (imperfect information) is feas-
ible. We also found that the duration of the contract has a significant impact into it,
only in cases where individuals know precisely (i.e. they have sophisticated beliefs) how
inconsistent their time-preferences are.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Introduction
From the beginning of the world, the agricultural sector has always played an essential
role into our society. This has been the case, even when right after the industrialization
many countries have favoured the development of the industrial and of the financial
sector in order to boost their economies.
The main reason is that agriculture was –and still is- the primary source of covering
population’s both direct (e.g. plants, crops, etc) and indirect (e.g. meat) needs for food.
In addition, agricultural products (e.g woods, mineral, crops, etc) are the basic inputs
for many other sectors (e.g. industrial, pharmaceutical, etc) of the economy. Thus,
the production (or extraction) of natural capital through agriculture has been seen as
an alternative source of income for many households. Nowadays, increasing population
and technological achievements have changed consumption patterns. In addition, many
earth scientists (e.g. Owen et al., 2010; Shafiee and Topal, 2009) have alerted that fossil
fuel reserves are going to reach its limits during the next few decades. Thus, agriculture
attracted attention by both academia and policy-makers as an alternative source of
covering this excess demand for energy (e.g. biomass).
One interesting aspect of agri-environmental sector is its circular interaction with the
environment, and more precisely with climate. Agriculture affects environment through
emissions of “greenhouse” gases (GHGs), namely carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous
oxide. Additionally, in many circumstances agricultural activities require an extensive
use of the land, which may in turn lead to deforestation, desertification, and soil and
water degradation. Finally yet importantly, the exploitation of land minerals through
extensive agriculture may decrease the ability of the Earth to absorb/reflect solar ra-
diation. These effects due to anthropocentric activities lead to reform of geological
1
landscape, which it lacks the ability to maintain the temperature of the atmosphere
in sustainable levels, decreasing in that way the stability and resilience of the climate
itself.
On the other hand, there is a positive externality of climate into agriculture. According
to Challinor et al. (2009), changes of temperature, variations in the concentration of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, precipitation and its interactions can affect agricul-
tural production and reproduction properties of many crops. Additionally, unbalanced
weather conditions can also affect the quality and quantity of agri-environmental goods
and services. The following figures illustrate the impact of (agri)environmental sector
into the environment and vice versa. The former (Figure 1.1) shows the contribution
of agriculture into GHGs emissions is U.S. from 1990 to 2013, as it reported by EPA’s
Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks, where crop cultivation and live-
stock take the grands for the highest contribution in GHGs emissions, but land use
and forestry has the highest percentage change (104.5%) at that period. In the lat-
ter (Figure 1.2), the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) presents the impact of air temperature into the production and
reproduction of corn and soybean, respectively, based on the work of Karl and Melillo
(2009). During the last few decades, both academia and policy-makers started to recon-
sider that by stabilizing this circular relationship between agriculture and environment,
economies could maintain into a sustainable growth path without any further envir-
onmental degradation. As a consequence, targets such as adoption of organic farming
techniques, conservation of a land in order to improve its quality, adoption of windmills
and solar panels for electricity generation and many more, became essential parts into
political agendas.
One “particularity” of such targets is that they concern the use and development of a
land which is privately owned, and therefore the policy-maker has not direct control
over the provision of the target. As a consequence, the policy-maker needs to design
agreements -which in legal terms are expressed by contracts- by which he delegates the
provision of the target to landowners (i.e. individuals) under a compensation scheme.
Official Community Plan (OCP), Forest Land Use Agreement (FLAg), International
Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) are examples of agreements that concern the use
and the development of a land which is privately owned. Another important character-
istic of (agri)environmental targets is that their benefits for the landowners come much
latter than the costs associated with their provision. Recent behavioural studies have
shown that this type of uncertainty may drive individuals to evaluate the future at a
2
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Figure 1.1: U.S. GHGs emissions from agricultural activities from 1990 to 2013
Figure 1.2: The impact of air temperature into the production and reproduction of corn
and soybean, respectively
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1.1. THE PURPOSE
declining rate instead of a constant rate, which in turn it makes their time-preferences
regarding the fulfilment of the contract inconsistent. In addition, policy-makers usually
have limited information on whether participants actually complies with the contract,
providing the necessary incentives to individuals to behave opportunistically. In other
words, dynamic inconsistencies (due to behavioural failures) and moral hazard (due
to information asymmetries on contract compliance) arise incentives to individuals to
breach on the contract.
1.1 The purpose
As we have stated above, there is no solely (agri)environmental target that concerns
the use and development of a private owned land. In this dissertation, we consider a
hypothetical situation in which the Agricultural Agency wants to improve the quality
of the land by decreasing the dependency on chemical fertilizers. In order to do so, the
policy-maker offers a Land Use Contract (LUC) to individual-farmers in which he/she
specifies how much of the agricultural activities of an individual-farmer must produced
by organic farming practices (e.g. by the use of organic fertilizers), the duration of the
contract and the compensation scheme. When the policy-maker designs such agreement,
he/she is calling to solve two types of problems: From one side, he/she needs to provide
these incentives in order to overcome dynamic inconsistencies of an individual decisions,
and from the other side he/she needs to offer an appropriate incentive scheme that
enforce compliance towards the contract.
Even though extensive theoretical research has been done in the elimination of the
impact of moral hazard into (agri)environmental contracts, the impact of behavioural
failures into such contracts has been limited analysed. In addition, even in cases where
dynamic inconsistencies take into consideration, the effort that an individual-farmer
provides is treated a binary variable (i.e. taking only two values, usually zero and one),
ignoring with that way the possibility that participants provide “something” in between
compliance and to “do nothing”.
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to present a theoretical analysis of a contract
for the provision of an (agri)environmental target in the presence of intertemporal time-
inconsistent individual-farmers, under both perfect and imperfect information, when
effort provided by them takes continuous values in a predetermine interval. More pre-
cisely, in cases where the target is the adaptation to organic farming practices, our
4
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purpose is to provide a reliable answer to “how agricultural contracts for the adapta-
tion to organic farming practices should be designed when dynamic inconsistencies on
participant decisions and moral hazard exists?”
1.2 Method
Our theoretical framework belongs to the class of “Principal-Agent Model”, where the
policy-maker is “the principal” and an individual-farmer is “the agent”. In order to
achieve his target, the principal offers a performance-based contract to the agent, which
its costs and benefits -for the agent- occur in different periods. Therefore, we use the
term “time-preferences” to refer to agent’s intretemporal preferences between imme-
diate costs and future benefits, and also we use the terms “exponential discounting”
and “hyperbolic discounting” to refer to the consistency and inconsistency of agent’s
time-preference, respectively. In other words, an exponential discounting agent is an
individual-farmer whose decisions are time-consistent. Thus, the impact of dynamic in-
consistencies will be introduced into this frame by distinguishing between the standard
case of exponential discounting individual-farmers and the case of hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmers.
Various functional forms have been used to capture the impact of dynamic inconsisten-
cies (Ainslie, 1975; Herrnstein, 1981; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991; Mazur, 1987) into
models. Here, we assume that time takes discrete values and therefore we implement
a (β, δ) model, in which the discount function of an intertemporal time-inconsistent
individual-farmer takes the quasi-hyperbolic form as it firstly proposed by Phelps and
Pollak (1968). Furthermore, we assume that the principal uses a commitment mechanism
to overcome behavioural failures (and hence dynamic inconsistencies), and monitoring
to overcome problems of moral hazard.
Once the principal set the target, the problem for him is to offer these incentives under
which an agent at each point of time will not has an incentive to breach on the contract.
We can determine these incentives by treating an agent as a sequence of independent
selves who at every period of time act based on her best self-interest. Thus, we simply
refer to an agent at period t as self -t, and the incentive-compatible contract is derived
by solving the intertemporal game between the principal and self-t backwards.
5
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1.3 Structure
The structure of this dissertation is as follows: In chapter 2, we present a brief overview
of the literature addressing the moral hazard in the context of contract design. In addi-
tion, we will provide a discussion on the current debate around the role of discounting in
economic decision-making. In chapter 3, we will present our theoretical framework un-
der perfect information, when contracts are of one and two periods, respectively, and we
will specify the incentives that makes a contract incentive-compatible for an exponential
discounting individual-farmer and a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer, respect-
ively. In chapter 4, we analyse how incentives between these two types of individuals
differ when moral hazard exists. In chapter 5, we discuss our key findings, and we also
highlights potential problems and areas for further research.
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Chapter 2
An Overview on Contract Theory, Intertemporal Choices
and Discounting
2.1 Contract Theory: A Brief Review
In legal systems, a contract represents an agreement in which a predetermine target
(object) enters voluntarily between two or more parties, each of them intends to create
one or more legal obligations towards that target. The elements of a contract may
vary among legal systems and purposes. The U.S. Legal System, for instance, states
that “the requisite elements that must be established to demonstrate the formation of
a legally binding contract are (1) offer; (2) acceptance; (3) consideration; (4) mutuality
of obligation; (5) competency and capacity; and, in certain circumstances, (6) a written
instrument” (US Legal Inc., n.d., Retrieved from http://contracts.uslegal.com/elements-
of-a-contract/ )
In economics, contract theory studies the “forces” that drive economic agents to behave
within contractual arrangements, generally in the presence of uncertainty, asymmetric
information and risk. A common form of such contract is voluntary agreements, in
which one party (the principal) delegates an obligation to another party (the agent)
under a compensation scheme. In that case, the problem for the former lies in providing
appropriate incentives through optimization algorithms that motivate agents to provide
his will as it specified by within the contract.
Adam Smith (1801) was the first who recognized the relationship between an owner of a
land (landlord) and a worker, where the former delegates the right of cultivation to the
latter. Later on, Barnard (1938) tried to establish an incentive theory in management,
by stressing out monetary and non-monetary incentives. In addition, he recognized that
7
2.2. INFORMATION ASYMMETRY: THE PROBLEM OF MORAL HAZARD
personal long-run needs is the force that drives someone to perform a task ordered by
his (or her) manager, and so incentives must satisfy these needs. The work of Barnard
inspired Arrow (1963), who dedicated part of his work into the problems that information
asymmetry and uncertainty create into portfolio choices (more precisely, on healthcare
private system). In his article, Arrow analysed how imperfect information between
patients and physicians on the diagnosis and the consequences of treatment can lead to
failure of healthcare industry, setting in that way the fundamental frame of the problem
of moral hazard and its consequences.
However, it was Jensen and Meckling (1979) who started to develop formally the
principal-agent theory as a combined product of economics and institutional theory, and
some years thereafter Milgrom and Roberts (1994) identified the four principles of con-
tract design, namely Informativeness Principle (Hölmstrom, 1979), Incentive-Intensity
Principle, Monitoring Intensity Principle and Equal Compensation Principle1.
2.2 Information Asymmetry: The Problem of Moral Hazard
The above four principles highlight one of the most common problems that the principal
calls to overcome in many real-time situations, namely his inability to perfectly observe
and verify agent’s action, due to political, ethical and/or technological boundaries (lim-
itations). This type of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent is
called moral hazard, and it motivates the latter to actions that drive markets to failures.
Dependently the time it occurs relative to the outcome, moral hazard referred either as
ex-post or ex-ante moral hazard.
The implications of problem of moral hazard do not concern only healthcare sector
as Arrow (1963) (and later on Shavell, 1979; Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983; Zweifel and
Manning, 2000) pointed out. Many other economists analysed the impact of this type of
information asymmetry into financial sector (e.g. Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; Milgrom
and Roberts, 1994; Eichengreen, 1999), in labour markets (e.g. Lambert, 1983; Foster
1The first principle states that any measure of performance that (on the margin) reveals information
about the effort level chosen by the agent should be included in the compensation contract. The
second principle states that the optimal intensity of incentives depends on four factors: (i) the
incremental profits created by additional effort; (ii) the precision with which the desired activities
are assessed; (iii) the agent’s tolerance towards risk; (iv) the agent’s responsiveness to incentives. The
third principle states that in cases where the optimal intensity of incentives is high, the corresponding
optimal level of monitoring is also high. The last principle states that action equally valued by the
principal should be equally valuable to the agent.
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and Rosenzweig, 1994), in federal fiscal constitutions (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1996)
and in taxation (e.g. Varian, 1980; Arnott and Stiglitz, 1986).
Recently evidence on the negative effects of climate change into societies, changes in
energy and consumption patterns, and also the “fear” of extinction of natural capital
reserves (e.g. fossil fuels, minerals, etc.), made (agri)environmental policy an attractive
field for further research, especially during the last twenty years.
For instance, Xepapadeas (1991); Fraser (2002); Hart and Latacz-Lohmann (2005);
Fraser (2013) analysed the impact of moral hazard into optimal (agri)environmental con-
tracts. Furthermore, researchers like MacKenzie et al. (2011); Salas and Roe (2012) tried
to determine inefficiencies that moral hazard creates in carbon sequestration contracts,
whereas other economists analysed how such informational problems affect crop insur-
ance contracts Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993); Smith and Goodwin (1996), nonpoint
pollution control contracts (Segerson, 1988; Cabe and Herriges, 1992) and in resource
extraction contracts (Engel and Fischer, 2008).
Environmental economists tried to eliminate the implications from moral hazard either
due to principal’s incomplete information (Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort, 1998; Oz-
anne et al., 2001; Fraser, 2002) or imperfect information (Choe and Fraser, 1999), mainly
by combining the frequency of individual auditing and the level of the penalty/reward.
In cases, however, where such combination is unfeasible, Fraser (2012) also states that
the principal can simply increase the risk for the agent of getting caught cheat on the
contract, whereas other economists (e.g. Xepapadeas, 1991) tried to determine policy
instruments (i.e. subsidies and fines) that enforce compliance towards environmental
policy in the absence of individual monitoring.
In dynamic contracts, alternative to auditing-penalty/subsidies schemes have been pro-
posed. Fraser (2004) for instance uses “targeting” as a mechanism of the elimination
of moral hazard. Another approach is that of Lambert (1983), who uses long-term
contracts in order to control moral hazard problems, whereas Fudenberg and Tirole
(1990) uses renegotiations as a policy tool for eliminating the impact of moral hazard
by “protecting” agents towards risk.
2.3 Intertemporal Time Preferences and Discounting
In decision theory, time-preferences refer to person’s preferences for the immediate utility
over deferring utility (Frederick et al., 2002a). Rae and Mixter (1905) were the first who
9
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made an attempt to identify the joint determinant of individual intertemporal choices2,
arguing that positive time-preferences eliminate the effective desire for accumulation. In
addition, Jevons (1884, 1905) and Senior (1836) interpreted preferences as “immediate
feelings”, and therefore individuals time-discount3 the future because either of the im-
mediate pleasure of anticipation (Jevons, 1884, 1905) or the immediate “discomfort” of
delaying gratification produced by self-denial (Senior, 1836).
Furthermore, von Böhm-Bawerk (1890) treated intertemporal choices as a problem of
allocation of an individual resources over different points in time, and his main argu-
ment was that individuals favour present over future because they underestimate future
events.
However, it was Samuelson (1937) the first who introduced the discounted utility model
(DUM) as a theoretical framework to value immediate and future utility. In his model,
an individual applies relative weights in period t, to her well-being in period t+ k, and
these weights (i.e. discount factor) depend on her pure rate of time-preferences (ρ),
which in turn reflects the psychological factors that determines intertemporal choices.
A direct implication of Samuelson’s model is it assumes positive discount rates, and
hence positive time-preferences (i.e. ρ > 0). However, the logic of this argument has
been questioned by many economists (Hirshleifer and Hall, 1970; Koopmans, 1960; Koop-
mans et al., 1964; Olson and Bailey, 1981), who stated that future events diminish to
almost zero if a positive real rate of return in savings combined even with negative
time-preferences4 .
The question on whether time-preferences of an individual is a psychological construct,
and hence they must be reflected in discount rates, has received a lot of debate among
academia. There is a body of evidence that oppose the use of time-preferences into
discount rates, because there is either low correlation between discount rates involving
aspects of time-preferences behaviour (Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Chapman et al.,
1999), or they are totally uncorrelated (Fuchs, 1980)5. Therefore, some economists
2Decisions involving trade-offs between costs and benefits occuring at different times.
3“We use the term time discounting broadly to encompass any reason for caring less about a future
consequence, including factors that diminish the expected utility generated by a future consequence,
such as uncertainty or changing tastes” (Frederick’s et. al. (2002), p.352).
4When it comes to intertgenerational choices, Koopmans (1967) refers to this result as “the paradox
of indefinitely postponed splurged”.
5A psychological construct or trait must satisfy the criteria of constancy, generality and correlation
between different measures (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2012).
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(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Frederick et al., 2002b) propose an alternative approach in
which time-preferences model in a pre-DUM way by “breaking” into their fundamental
parts -namely, impulsivity, compulsivity and inhibition6-, and so the prediction of various
aspect of behaviour becomes more reliable.
2.3.1 Exponential Discounting
In general, any discounting function can be represented by D(t) = ∏t−1k=0 (1/(1 + ρk)),
where ρk is the discount rate applied between periods k and k + 1. Many DU-models
assume that discount function takes the exponential form of D(t) = 1/(1 + ρ)t, in which
discount rates are constant (i.e. ρk = ρ).
The attractive feature of such exponential discount function is that the constancy of
discount rates implies that an individual at every period k applies the same weights in
all future events, and therefore discounting is stationary (i.e. Dk = D).
In the context of intertemporal choices, stationarity of the discount function implies
that at any point of time, a person values future utilities in exactly the same way, and
therefore her preferences between immediate utility and delayed utility do not change at
any point of time. In other words, exponential discount functions imply that person’s
intertemporal choices are time-consistent, and therefore time itself has zero impact her
decisions.
However, there is a body of academia that opposes the preferences time-consistency
assumption and its implications. Ramsey (1928) -for instance- claims that exponential
discounting is a “tyranny of the present over the future”, meaning that an individual
cannot observe future preferences and needs, and therefore with constant discount rates
an individual falsely assumes that these future preferences are valued equally with her
present one.
Furthermore, many laboratory experiments (Ainslie, 1992; Frederick et al., 2002a; Del-
laVigna, 2007) conclude that individuals discount the future at a declining rate instead
of a constant rate, due to decision-making heuristic, cognitive biases, systematic errors,
and self-control problems (Hepburn et al., 2010). The problem arises from declining
discount rates is that intertemporal choices of an individual are time-inconsistent.
6Wilkinson and Klaes (2012) state that impulsivity refers to a situation in which people act in a
spontaneous and unplanned way, compulsivity refers to a situation where people make plans and
stick to them, and inhibition involves the ability to inhibit impulsive behavior that may follow
visceral stimuli.
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In the light of new era on human behaviour, enabled the interest of intertemporal choice
researchers to rethink the realism of normative discounting theory, giving with that way
the necessary space for more descriptive theoretical frameworks to come to the surface.
Among these “new” descriptive models, hyperbolic discount functions attracted the most
attention.
2.3.2 Hyperbolic Discounting
Strotz (1955) was the first economist who became aware of the limitations of exponen-
tial discounting (and hence constant discount rates), altering the need for alternative
approaches to DU-models, but the first formal implementation of declining discount
rates became by Chung and Herrnstein (1967) and Phelps and Pollak (1968), who used
hyperbolic discount functions to capture the effects of individual time-preferences.
One reason that hyperbolic discount functions became so popular is that results from
many behavioural traits that constructed under a reward scheme smaller-sooner/larger-
later, state that individuals often have the tendency to “procrastinate” or to “tempt”
their intertemporal choices7 (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), and so intertemporal preferences
are inconsistent. Furthermore, other behavioural experiements conclude that people
usually suffer from “present bias”8 (Green et al., 1994; Kirby and Herrnstein, 1995;
Millar and Navarick, 1984; Solnick et al., 1980)). It has been argued that hyperbolic
discount function can eliminate such self-control problems (Akerlof, 1991) by the use of
a commitment device, which it also improves person’s task performance (Giné et al.,
2010).
Another reason that advocates the use of such functions is that they fit the data from
various experiments on decision-making better than exponential functions, and hence hy-
perbolic discounting models provide more realistic recommendation (Kirby, 1997; Kirby
and Maraković, 1995; Green and Myerson, 2004; Rachlin et al., 1991), and also biological
experiments (e.g McClure et al. (2007) show that brain areas involved in inter-temporal
decision-making support quasi-hyperbolic framework.
7This type of self-control problems arises when a person prefers the larger-later outcome over smaller-
sooner outcome, but somewhere in the future this preference reverses. The term “temptation” is
used to describe such self-control problems when the outcome is positive, whereas “procrastination”
is used for negative outcomes (Wilkinson and Klaes, 2012).
8Present bias refers to a situation where individuals may prefer 100€ today over 110€ in a month, but
they prefer 110€ in one year and a day over 100€ in one year.
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Even though hyperbolic discount functions provides a more descriptive analysis into
intertemporal choices, there is a body of economists who oppose the use of such func-
tional forms. Among them, Chabris et al. (2006) highly criticized the use of hyperbolic
discount function, where their main argument lies on that time preferences cannot be
observed when exists intertemporal arbitrage opportunities, and so neither exponential
discount functions nor hyperbolic discount functions can capture accurately the impact
of behavioural failures.
Furthermore, Sopher and Sheth (2006) claimed that empirical research does not provide
robust evidence in favour of hyperbolic discounting over other alternative methods. In
addition, Rubinstein (2003) rejects that evidence from “preference reversals” 9can be
interpreted as evidence for hyperbolic discounting. Instead, he proposes that heuristic
methods that based on “similarity relations”10 can provide consistent results as well.
Finally, according to some other scientists (Read, 2001), the evidence in favour of hy-
perbolic frame may reflect of “sub-additive” discounting, which implies that discount
rate is not a function of time but is rather a function of delay.
2.3.2.1 Hyperbolic discounting and (agri)environmental policies
A major characteristic for many (agri)environmental projects and policies is that their
benefits for an individual occur much latter than the costs she needs to pay for their
provision. In addition, the outcome for many agricultural activities does not depends
only on individual efforts, but also on factors in which she has limited or zero control (e.g.
weather conditions, natural phenomena, etc.) and these factors have high-magnitude
effects. Moreover, many (agri)environmental initiatives have spatial implications among
different countries.
For these reason, economists like Kahneman et al. (1994); Shogren and Taylor (2008)
pointed out the positive impact of behavioural economics into environmental planning,
and motivated further research towards natural resource management (Hepburn, 2003;
Settle and Shogren, 2004; Hepburn et al., 2010), climate change (Heal, 1997; Dasgupta,
2008; Anthoff et al., 2009) and land use (Laibson, 1997; Fearnside et al., 2000; Salois
and Moss, 2011).
9Preference reversal refers to phenomenon in which individuals prefer a situation (or a lottery, a
gamble, etc). A over B, but they attach a higher price in B than in A.
10Similarity relations refers to situation in which individuals ignore small differences when they compare
decisions, and focus on large differences.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Framework under Perfect Information
Let’s consider an Agricultural Agency (from now on “the principal”) which wants to
achieve a specific (agri)environmental target that concerns the use and development of a
privately owned land. Since the Agency has no control over the land, the principal needs
to design an agreement -legally expressed by the form of a contract- by which he deleg-
ates the provision of the target to landowner-farmers (from now on “the agent”) under a
compensation scheme. Emission reduction from greenhouse gases, reduction of chemical
fertilizers, improvements of the quality of the land, forest conservation and wetlands af-
forestation are only some examples of such target, and Official Community Plan (OCP),
Forest Land Use Agreement (FLAg), International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA)
are examples of agreements that contained in the class of Land Use Contracts (LUC).
However, there is no universal construction of a LUC. Its elements depend primarily on
the nature of the target, on the principal’s objectives and on the characteristics of the
participants.
In this dissertation, we consider a hypothetical situation in which the Agriculture Agency
wants to improve the quality of the land by decreasing the dependency on chemical fer-
tilizers. In order to do so, the principal determines the degree of agricultural activities
produced by organic farming techniques (i.e. the target), like by adopting organic fer-
tilizers, and therefore he offers a LUC, yT (e∗) = 〈p〉, to individual-farmers where:
1. Participation is voluntary,
2. The total duration of the contract is of T periods,
3. e∗ ∈ [0, 1] is the pre-period targeted organic agriculture. That is, e∗ = 0 implies
that agricultural activities are produced exclusively by conventional agriculture,
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whereas e∗ = 1 implies that agricultural activities are produced exclusively by
organic agriculture,
4. The compensation that participants receive at every period is given by the following
scheme: R = pe, where p > 0 is the pre-period price subsidy, and e ∈
[
0, e∗
]
is the
agricultural activities that an individual individual-farmer chooses to produce by
organic farming,
5. An individual-farmer can freely choose the organic farming technique.
Furthermore, the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral, and he has a utility function,
U(e), which is increasing and linear in the level of effort e (U ′ > 0 ). The Agricultural
Agency cares only for its own well-being, and thus, by setting the target e∗ wants to
achieve utility U(e∗).
For the sake of simplicity we assume that T = 1, and so the structure of such “static”
contract is as follows: At period t = 0, an individual-farmer considers the choice of
whether contract is profitable for him, and also she sets the level of effort maximizing
her profits. At t = 1, the principal observes agent’s effort, and at t = 2 the contract
ends and participants receive their compensation regarding their effort at t = 1. The
following figure illustrates the stages of the contract with respect to time
t=0
The contract is signed
t=1
The effort is exerted
t=2
Contract ends
Figure 3.1: The stages of an one-period contract w.r.t. time (t)
So far we have mainly focused on principal’s behaviour. Let’s now characterize the
agent in our model: An individual-farmer is assumed to be risk-neutral and she has an
income, A, from conventional agricultural activities. If an agent sign the contract, then
she needs to adopt organic farming techniques. However, it usually the case where such
techniques lack of efficiency relative to conventional agriculture, and so by participation
in the agreement an individual-farmer obtains a different level of income from agriculture,
I(e), which it is assumed that its value is substantial lower than A (that is, I(e) < A).
In addition, there is nothing to indicate that higher adaptation to organic farming leads
necessarily to lower and lower income. Since the scope of this dissertation is to emphasize
on the principal’s incentives for the provision of the target, it is reasonable to assume
that the impact of the effort on I is almost zero (i.e. I ′ → 0), and therefore we treat
that new income as a constant (i.e. I(e) ≡ I).
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Furthermore, the contract is costly for an individual-farmer only at the level of effort she
exerts (i.e. the degree of organic farming adaptation), and this cost, ψ, is an increasing
and convex function of e (ψ′ ≥ 0 and ψ′′ ≥ 0), and also 0 ≤ ψ(e) ≤ 1. In the following,
consistently with our assumptions, we assume that the cost function takes the quadratic
form ψ(e) = e2/2. The convexity of ψ implies that profits, Π(e), from participation is
an increasing and concave function in the level of effort, e (Π′ ≥ 0 and Π′′ ≤ 0).
Furthermore, consistency of an individual-farmer time-preferences reflects in her discount
functions, D(t), which we assume that they take discrete values with respect to time.
Here we compare the behaviour of an intertemporal time-inconsistent farmer with the
standard case of an intertemporal time-consistent farmer, where the former uses a quasi-
hyperbolic discount function, DH(t), and the latter uses a discrete-value exponential
discount function, DE. Independently which discount function an agent uses, we treat
her as a sequence of independent selves who at each point of time act based on her best-
self interest. Hence, we refer to an individual-farmer at period t ≤ T simply as self -t,
and thus we derive the incentive compatible contract by solving the intertemporal game
between the principle and self -t backwards.
However, at t ≤ T − 1 an hyperbolic discounting agent has different beliefs regard-
ing the consistency of her decisions. Here, we consider only the two extreme cases,
where an intertemporal time-inconsistent farmer is either completely unaware (i.e. na-
ive) or completely aware (i.e. sophisticated) of the inconsistency of her time-preferences,
and we use j = N,S to denote their type. More precisely, naive is an intertemporal
time-inconsistent farmer who falsely believes that her future actions are consistent with
her current plans, and so she believes that future selves use DE. On the other hand,
sophisticated is an intertemporal time-inconsistent farmer who perfectly knows “how
inconsistent” her future actions are relative to her current plans, and so she perfectly
knows that future selves use exactly the same discount function DH . Finally, we assume
that an unaware hyperbolic discounting farmer lacks of self-learning processes from pre-
vious decisions. As a consequence, a naive agent remains naive for every period T − 1,
but she becomes aware of the intertemporal time-inconsistency of her decisions only at
the last period of the contract (i.e. only at T ).
The structure of this section is as follows: We start by assuming that the principal
has perfect information on agent’s actions and we also use decisions of an exponential
discounting decision-maker as a benchmark in order to draw our conclusions. Next,
we extend our analysis into a two-period contracts, where the role of time itself in
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decision-making is further investigated. In the last part of this section we arise the
assumption of perfect information and we analyse the behaviour of an intertemporal
time-inconsistent decision-maker in one-period and two-period contracts, respectively
keeping again normative economic theory as a benchmark.
3.1 Individuals with Intertemporal Consistent Time-Preferences
As we have already mentioned in the previous chapters, the behaviour of an inter-
temporal time-consistent individual-farmer can be modelled by the use of exponential
discount functions. In a discrete-time framework, exponential discount functions have
the form:
DE(t) =
 1 when t=0δt when t>0
where δ = 1/(1 + ρ) is the pre-period discount factor and ρ is the pure rate of time-
preferences.
The problem for the Agricultural Agency is to determine these incentives that motivate
provision of the targeted outcome, provided that an individual-farmer has singed the
contract at t = 0. In that case, the principal knows that self -1 discounted present value
of her net benefits is:
DPVΠ1(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe)δ (3.1)
The problem for self-1 (i.e. self-1’s objective) is to choose the degree of organic farm-
ing into (i.e. effort) that maximizes (3.1), provided that self -0 has already signed the
contract. The solution to this unconstrained profit-maximization problems gives the
optimal condition11 ψ′(e) = pδ, which it says that an exponential discounting self -1
chooses to produce her agricultural activities by organic farming techniques up to that
point, in which the marginal cost of the adaptation to organic farming equals her dis-
counted marginal revenues (i.e. pre-period subsidy). More precisely, given the quadratic
form of our cost function self -1 optimal effort degree of adaptation is:
e = pδ
where e ≤ e∗ → p ≤ e∗δ−1.
11See section A in the appendix for a complete derivation
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This restriction states that there is a threshold on the pre-period subsidy, at which any
further increase of it will not produce more effort by an exponential discounting agent.
In other words, principal’s decision to offer more than e∗δ−1 would be unreasonable,
since such higher price would not motivate participants to increase agricultural activities
produced by organic farming. Thus, a time-consistent individual-farmer has an incentive
to provide the targeted outcome (e = e∗) under a price of p = e∗δ−1.
Now, let’s going back one period (t = 0 ). At that point of time, an exponential dis-
counting self -0 considers the profitability of principal’s offer relative to her conventional
agricultural activities. If she decide to accept the offer, then she needs to forsake her
income A from her agricultural activities produced by conventional farming, and her
discounted present value of her net benefits will be:
DPVΠ0(e) = −ψ(e)δ + (I + pe)δ2
Hence, at any price offered by the principal, self -0 plans to adopt organic farming by
e0=arg maxeDPVΠ0 ⇔ e0=pδ, which is exactly the same with what self -1 actual does.
Thus, from self -0 perspective participation in the agreement is profitable for her if and
only if:
DPVΠ0(e0) ≥ DPV A
− ψ(e0)δ + (I + pe0)δ2 ≥ Aδ2 (3.2a)
Inequality (3.2a) describes self -0 incentive-rationality constraint (IRE), and it states
that an exponential discounting individual-farmer is willing to abandon her conventional
farming techniques if and only if her discounted net benefits from undertaking effort e0
are at least equal to her discounted income from conventional agriculture.
If we substitute e0 = pδ into (3.2a) and solve with respect to the pre-period subsidy,
then IRE becomes:
p ≥ φE (3.2b)
where φE = [2(A− I)/δ]1/2 denotes self -0’s opportunity cost from forgoing her income
from conventional farming12. Thus, an alternative interpretation of IRE could be that
the price offered by the principal for the adaptation to e0 degree of organic farming must
covers self -0′s opportunity cost, otherwise contract becomes unprofitable relative to her
income by conventional farming techniques.
12The reader can find detailed derivation of the incentive-rationality constraint for a time-consistent
decision-maker at section B in the Appendix
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The principal wants from the participant to provide effort e∗. As we have already presen-
ted, an intertemporal time-consistent individual-farmer provides the targeted outcome
(e∗) under a price of p. Hence, (3.2b) becomes p ≥ [2(A− I)/δ]1/2. For the rest of this
dissertation, we refer to that as the incentive-compatible condition for an exponential
discounting decision-makers (ICCE).
Alternatively, we can express ICCE in terms of the cost associated with the provision
of the targeted outcome, by solving (3.2a) with respect to ψ and by also setting p = p.
In that case, we have that -ψ(e∗)≤-(A-I)δ, and it says that an exponential discounting
agent signs the contract as long as the cost of adapting e∗ organic farming techniques is
lower than or equal to the cost that an individual-farmer experiences by maintain her
conventional farming techniques, and hence by obtaining income A instead of I.
PROPOSITION 1: Let e∗ be the targeted outcome. Then, a contract y1(e∗) = 〈p〉 is
incentive compatible for an individual with intertemporal consistent time-preferences if
and only if p ≥ φE.
Summing up, the principal at t = 0 knows the followings: (i) e0 = e. That is, the actual
performance of an exponential discounting individual-farmer at t = 1 is consistent with
her plans at t=0; (ii) the price for the provision of the targeted adaptation to organic
farming must also cover self -0’s opportunity cost; (iii) DE(0)/DE(1) = 1/δ, where the
left-hand side is the marginal rate of substitution (MRSE0,1) between immediate costs
and future benefits, and MRSE0,1 is the same for every self -t. That is, ρ shows the
marginal rate of substitution between intermediate costs and future benefits for every
exponential discounting self -t13.
3.2 Individuals with Intertemporal Inconsistent Time-Preferences
As we have already mentioned in the previous chapter, the behaviour of an intertemporal
time-inconsistent individual-farmer can be modelled by the use of hyperbolic discount
functions. In a discrete-time framework, an approximation of a hyperbolic discount
function can take the quasi-hyperbolic functional form (Phelps and Pollak, 1968):
13Note that δ = 1/(1 + ρ)⇒ 1/δ = 1 + ρ⇒ ρ = (1− δ)/δ
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DH(t) =
 1 when t=0βδt when t>0
where the parameter β ∈ (0, 1) shows the deviation from exponential discounting. Al-
ternatively, Salois (2008) noted that the presence of β gives a measure of how payoffs
from immediate decision valued more relative to the payoffs from postponing decisions,
and therefore it is reasonable to argue that β shows the degree of present bias.
Following the same way of thinking as in the case of exponential discounting agnets,
we start our analysis in a backward chronological order. Provided that an intertem-
poral time-inconsistent individual-farmer has signed the contract at t = 0, a hyperbolic
discounting self -1 has discounted present value of her net benefits:
DPVΠh1(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe)βδ (3.3)
and so, self -1 chooses to adopt organic farming by e = arg maxeDPVΠh1. Following
the standard optimization procedure14 we obtain the optimal condition ψ′(e) = pβδ,
which given the quadratic form of our cost function we obtain the optimal degree to
organic farming adaptation for an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer:
e = pβδ
where e ≤ e∗ → p ≤ e∗(βδ)−1.
This constraint is similar to the the price restriction for a time-consistent participant
and it also states that a very high price is unreasonable, since self -1 does not consider
to increase her agricultural activities produced by organic farming (i.e. to provide more
effort) more than the targeted levels. Finally, the targeted adaptation to organic farming
(i.e. e∗) maximizes equation (3.3) under a price of p=e∗(βδ)−1. At that point of our
analysis, the reader can recall that a time-consistent self -1 chooses to adapt organic
farming techniques by e = pδ, and so e = βe. Given that β ∈ (0, 1), a hyperbolic
discounting self -1 provides lower effort (i.e. adapt organic farming at a lower degree)
than an exponential discounting self -1 (e < e), as a consequence the former requires a
higher price than the latter in order to provide the targeted outcome, e∗ (p > p).
14The procedure of solving self-1 profit-maximization problem is similar with the procedure for an
intertemporal time-consistent individual-farmer, and therefore the reader can have a look in section
A at the Appendix
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Now, let’s going back one period (t = 0 ). At that point of time, self -0 considers
the profitability of principal’s offer relative to her income from agricultural activities
produced by conventional farming. If she decide to accept the offer, then she needs to
abandon her income from agricultural activities produced by conventional farming, and
the discounted present value of her net benefits will be:
DPVΠh0(e) = −ψ(e)βδ + (I + pe)βδ2
and so self -0 plans to adapt to organic farming by eh0 = arg maxeDPVΠh0 ⇔ eh0 =
pδ = e0 units. That is, ahyperbolic discounting individual-farmer makes the same plans
for the future with an exponential discounting individual-farmer. As a consequence, we
could argue that planned effort is always the same independently the consistency of an
individual time-preferences.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, at that point of time self-0 is either
naive or sophisticated. As a consequence, self-0 has different beliefs on the discount
function that self -1 uses, and hence whether her plans actually carry out by her. For
this reason, an intertemporal time-inconsistent self -0 does not consider participation on
her planned effort directly, but rather on another one which it also takes into account her
beliefs. If we use εj to denote selfj-0 beliefs on the effort that self -1 provides, then
εj = arg max
e
{
− ψ(e) + (I + pe)bjδ
}
⇔ εj = bjeh0
where bj = {β, 1} is a parameter that shows the selfj-0 beliefs regarding the consistency
of her plans (and hence, the functional form of the discount function that self -1 uses).
Thus, for a naive agent bN = 1, whereas for a sophisticated agent bS = β. Therefore,
selfj-0 is willing to sign the contract if and only if:
DPVΠh0(εj) ≥ DPV A
− ψ(εj)βδ + (I + pεj)βδ2 ≥ Aβδ2 (3.4a)
where inequality (3.4a) describes selfj-0 incentive-rationality constraint (IRj).
We can express IRj either with respect to the pre-period subsidy, or with respect to the
cost associated with the planned effort eh0. In the former case, IRj becomes
p ≥ φj(T = 1) (3.4b)
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where φj(1) = [2(A − I)/bjδ(2 − bj)]1/2 is selfj-0 opportunity cost for abandoning her
income from agricultural activities produced by conventional farming15, whereas in the
latter case, IRj becomes -ψ(eh0)≤-δ(A-I)/bj(2-bj), where now the right-hand side shows
the discounted cost for selfj-0 to maintain her conventional agriculture activities.
Let’s consider the first interpretation of IRj. In that case, we can show16 that
φS(1)>φN(1)=φE ∀β(0,1). In addition, a closer look at εj reveals that selfN -0 be-
lieves that for self -1 the MRSN0,1 = MRSE0,1 = 1/δ. On the other hand, selfS-0 knows
that for self -1 MRSS0,1 = MRSH0,1 = 1/βδ. That is, a naive agent underestimates the
costs associated with the provision of her plans, eh0 ( MRSS0,1 > MRSN0,1), and so she is
more willing to abandon her conventional agricultural practices (φS(1) > φN(1)) than
a sophisticated agent for any subsidy p. Hence, it is reasonable to argue that if the
pre-period subsidy motivates participation for naive individual-farmers, then it does not
necessarily mean that such price motivates also sophisticated individual-farmer toward
participation, whereas the opposite always holds. Finally, the reader can recall that
once the contract begins (i.e. at t = 1) both naive and sophisticated agents adapt to
organic farming by e∗ units under a price equals p, and so we are ready to present our
next proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: Let e∗ be the targeted outcome and p ≥ φE is the pre-period sub-
sidy. Then, a contract y1(e∗) = 〈p〉 is always incentive compatible for naive hyperbolic
discounting individual-farmers, but it becomes incentive compatible for both sophisticated
and naive agents if and only if p ≥ φS(1).
Summing up, the principal at t = 0 knows the followings: (i) eh0 = e0. That is,
both naive and sophisticated agents and exponential discounting decision-makers make
the same plans for future levels of effort; (ii) at t = 1 both naive and sophisticated
agents provide an effort substantial lower than exponential discounting agents (e < e);
(iii) DH(0)/DH(1) = 1/βδ, and so MRSH0,1 > MRSE0,1. That is, the marginal rate
of substitution between immediate costs and future benefits is higher for a dynamic
discounting decision-maker than for an exponential discounting decision-maker, and so
15Detailed derivation of at section B, in the Appendix.
16The reader can find a complete proof in the Appendix, at Section B
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provision of the same targeted outcome requires higher prices in the case of the former
(p > p); (iii) naive and sophisticated individual-farmers have different opportunity costs
(φS(1) > φN(1) = φE(1)), and therefore a price that motivates participation for the
former, does not necessarily implies that the same prices motivates participation for the
latter.
The Introduction of a Commitment Mechanism
From the very beginning of this dissertation, we stated that our purpose is to provide a
reliable answer on which is the impact of dynamic inconsistencies of individuals’ decisions
into contract design, when the target broadly concerns the use and development of a
privately own land, and more precisely when the target is the adaptation to organic
farming practices. At a first glance, the presence of an intertemporal time-inconsistent
individual-farmer enforces the principal to offer a subsidy p = p > p in order to motivate
provision of e∗. This higher price creates a cost for the policy-maker, which it comes
purely from individual behavioural failures to commit to their plans. Thus, the impact
of dynamic inconsistencies (DI) is:
DI = p− p = p
(1− β
β
)
where the extent of the impact of dynamic inconsistencies into contract design is de-
termined by the present bias ratio, rβ = (1− β)/β.
Let’s have a closer look at rβ. One can easily observe that the the lower is β, the higher is
the present bias ratio, and hence the higher is the impact of dynamic inconsistencies into
contract design , since the principal needs to offer a higher price in order to motivate the
provision of e∗. Another interesting result is that the limβ→0 rβ = ∞. That is, in cases
where β approaches zero, then the the extent of the impact of dynamic inconsistencies
of an individual’s decisions approaches to infinity. The interpretation of this result is
that when the present bias takes “extreme high values”, then the policy-maker needs
to offer an infinite subsidy in order to motivate the targeted adaptation to organic
farming practices. However, such high price is practically impossible, and so we could
argue that when β approaches zero, incentive-compatible contacts for intertemporal time-
inconsistent individual-farmers do not exist. In that case, the only thing that principal
can do is to offer p, allowing to a hyperbolic discounting agent to underprovide, provided
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that selfj-0 has signed the contract17.
The above discussion indicates that the presence of a hyperbolic discounting agent cre-
ates almost zero problems -in terms of the level of the subsidy the principal offers- only
when her behaviour approaches that of an exponential discounting agent (i.e. when
β → 1). However, this argument is not completely correct. The reason is that both
selfN -0 and selfS-0 individual-farmers have an incentive to adapt to organic farming
practices by e∗ units under a subsidy equals p. Thus, the policy-maker can overcome the
impact of dynamic inconsistencies by simply imposing a commitment mechanism which
will enforce a hyperbolic discounting self-1 to stay in selfj-0’s initial optimal plan.
Let’s assume that such mechanism takes the form of a penalty according to the following
scheme:
P (e) =
 0 if e = e0d(eh0 − e) if e < e0
where d > 0 is the unit penalty that a hyperbolic discounting agent needs to pay for
any deviation from selfj − 0 optimal plan. Once the principal impose such mechanism,
self-1 discounted present value of her net benefits becomes:
DPVΠ∗h1(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe− d(e∗ − e))βδ
and self-1 chooses to adapt to organic farming practices by e∗ = arg maxeDPVΠ∗h1(e)⇔
e∗ = βδ(p+ d) units, where again e∗ ∈ [0, e∗]→ d ≤ p(1− β)/β.
This restriction on the value of the marginal penalty is similar to the restriction on the
value of prices, and it states that an “extreme high” penalty is useless, because it does
not motivate self-1 to do more than e∗. Hence, the targeted outcome maximizes self-1
profits if18:
d∗ = p
1− β
β

This optimal value of a commitment mechanism provides us with very useful information.
First of all, d∗ = DI. In other words, optimal penalty is simply a lump-sum transfer
paid by participants to the Agency, and so when such penalty is feasible, the principal
offers p and the impact of dynamic inconsistencies impact into contract design is zero.
17The who is going to participate in the agreement specified by the value of p. If p ≥ φS(1), then both
naive and sophisticated sign the contract, whereas if φN (1) ≤ p < φS(1), then only naive agents
sign the contract.
18The reader can find a complete explanation at section A in the Appendix.
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Secondly, d∗/p = (1−β)/β. That is, the present bias ratio determines whether the value
of optimal penalty exceeds the price for the provision of the targeted outcome. More
precisely, if β < 1/2, then the optimal penalty exceeds the optimal subsidy (d∗ > p),
whereas if β > 1/2, then the opposite holds (d∗ < p). The most interesting result,
however, is that the limβ→0 d∗ = ∞. The interpretation is that if the present bias is
“too high”, the principal must impose an “extreme high” penalty in order to motivate
provision of e∗. However, it is usually the case where such high penalty is practically
infeasible due to technical, political and/or ethical boundaries. In that case, one could
argue that the Agricultural Agency could offer p, but as we have already explained such
high price is also infeasible. As a consequence, we can argue that if d∗ is infeasible,
then incentive-compatible contracts for a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer do
not exists.
One interesting question would be concerned the impact of such commitment mechanism
into selfj-0’s incentive-rationality constraint. At t = 0, a hyperbolic discounting agent
plans to adapt to organic farming practices by e∗h0 = arg maxeDPVΠ∗h0 ⇔ e∗h0 = (p+d)δ
units, which e∗h0 = e∗ ∀d ≥ 0 since e∗h0 ∈ [0, e∗]. Therefore, a naive agent believes that
she always provides e∗, independently how high the penalty is (ε∗N = e∗h0 = e∗ ∀d ≥ 0).
In addition, a sophisticated agent also knows that self -1 provides the target, provided
that (a minimum) d∗ is feasible (ε∗S = βe∗h0 = e∗ ∀d ≥ d∗). As a consequence, selfj-0
incentive-rationality constraint becomes:
−ψ(ε∗S)βδ + (I + pε∗S − d∗(e∗ − ε∗S)βδ2 ≥ Aβδ2
−ψ(e∗) + (I + pe∗)δ ≥ Aδ
p ≥ φE
That is, once the commitment mechanism takes place, a contract y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉 is
incentive-compatible for both naive and sophisticated individual-farmer provided ICCE
is satisfied. In that case, the contracts y1(e∗) = 〈p〉 and y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉produce the same
outcome for the principal, and so the Agricultural Agency can offer y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉,
without caring whether dynamic inconsistencies on individual-farmer time-preferences
exists. Now we are ready to present our third proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: Let’s consider the case where the following holds: e∗ is the targeted
outcome, p ≥ φE, p ≥ φS(1) and d > 0 is the penalty set by the principal. Then, the
value of present bias ratio determines the extent of dynamic inconsistencies into contract
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design. More precisely,
a) if d ≥ d∗(rβ) , then y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉 is the incentive-compatible contract for a hyper-
bolic discounting individual-farmer, and DI = 0,
b) if d < d∗(rβ), then y1(e∗) = 〈p〉 is the incentive-compatible contract for a hyperbolic
discounting individual-farmer, and DI = d∗,
c) If d∗(rβ) approaches infinity, then the incentive-compatible contract for a hyperbolic
discounting decision-maker does not exist.
What we have seen so far is the impact of dynamic inconsistencies into contract design,
when the Agricultural Agency has perfect information on individual-farmers’ perform-
ance and the duration of the contract is only for one period. What comes next, is a
modification of the above framework in which we increase the duration of the contract
time by one period. The purpose of this modification is to analyse the impact of time
itself when dynamic inconsistencies on individual-farmer time-preferences also exist19.
3.3 A Two-Periods Theoretical Framework under Perfect
Information
This part of our theoretical analysis under perfect information is dedicated to present
the impact of time itself into contract design for the provision of an (agri)environmental
good/service, under both perfect information and the presence of a hyperbolic discount-
ing decision-maker. Here, we consider the hypothetical situation in which an individual-
farmer needs to adapt to organic farming practices by e∗ units at both the first and
the second period. The structure of an two-periods contract describes as follows: At
period t = 0, an individual-farmer decide whether to sign the contract. At t = 1, the
contract begins and the agent chooses the current and future degree of adaptation to
organic farming. At t = 2, the principal observes the level of effort that agents provided
at t = 1 and he compensates them. At that point of time, the agent adapt again to
organic farming, the degree of which becomes observable at the end of the contract (i.e.
at t = 3). The following graph illustrates the stages of the contract with respect to
time:
19However, the reader must keep in mind that given the limited nature of this dissertation with respect
to time, the discussion that follows on the results of the following dynamic extension remains on the
very basic
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t=0
The contract
is signed
t=1
The effort is
exerted
t=2
Revenue
received, new
effort exerted
t=3
Contract ends
Figure 3.2: The stages of a two-period contract w.r.t. time (t)
As we have already demonstrated, an intertemporal time-consistent individual-farmer
will always fulfil her plans. Thus, an exponential discounting agent adapt to organic
farming practices by e∗ units, if a pre-period subsidy p is feasible. In addition, the
consistency of her time-preferences implies that the her opportunity cost is independent
of the duration of the contact (φE(1) = φE(2) = · · · = φE(T ) ≡ φE). As a consequence,
the contract yT (e∗) = 〈p〉 is incentive-compatible for an intertermporal time-consistent
individual-farmer for any T , as long as p ≥ φE. For this reason, we consider here only
the case of individual-farmers with intertemporal inconsistent time-preferences.
Solving again the intertemporal game between the principal and self -t, we have that at
t = 2 a hyperbolic discounting agent has discounted present value of her net benefits:
DPVΠh2(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe))βδ (3.5)
One can observe that expression (3.5) is identical with expression (3.3) in one-period
contract, and therefore self -2 adapts to organic farming exactly by the same degree
with an intertemporal time-inconsistent self -1 in one-period contract. In other words,
self -2 optimal effort is e2 = pβδ, and therefore she has an incentive to adapt to the
organic farming practices by the targeted degree under a price of p2 = e
∗(βδ)−1.
Going back one period (t = 1), an intertemporal time-inconsistent selfj-1 has discounted
present value of her net benefits:
DPVΠh1(e1, e2) = −ψ(e1) + (I + pe1))βδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Benefits from immediate actions
+
(
− ψ(e2)βδ + (I + pe2))βδ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net Benefits from future actions
(3.6)
where e2 denotes selfj-1 plans for the future. The key characteristic of expression (3.6)
is that selfj-1’s profits do not depend only on her current actions, but also on what
future self (i.e sself -2) is going to do. Hence, by solving selfj-1 profit-maximization
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problem we obtain the optimal conditions20 ψ′(e1) = pβδ and ψ′(e2) = pδ, and given
the quadratic form of our cost function we finally have that:
e1 = e2β (3.7)
where condition (3.7) shows the optimal relationship between immediate and future
efforts towards the degree of adaptation to organic farming practices. In other words,
we can see that e2 > e1 ∀β ∈ (0, 1), and so selfj-1 finds optimal to provide a lower
effort now, but a higher effort at the next period. However, at that point of time
an individual-farmer is either sophisticated or naive, and therefore selfj-1 has different
beliefs regarding the consistency of her plans. That is, selfj-1 believes that self -2 adapts
to organic farming by a degree of εj,1 = bje2, and therefore her current optimal degree
of adaption is:
ej,1 = εj,1β
and so,
ej,1 =
 pδβ if selfN -1pδβ2 if selfS-1
The reader can recall that in one-period contracts, beliefs determined only participation
decision. However, when contracts extend to two periods, beliefs determine also the
effort of a hyperbolic discounting self -1. More precisely, we can easily observe that
eS,1 < eN,1. In addition, we saw that at t = 2, a hyperbolic discounting individual-
farmer adapts to organic farming practices by e2 units. Thus, the optimal degree to
adaptation to organic farming for a sophisticated and for a naive agent in a two-periods
contract is eS = (eS,1, e2) and eN = (eN,1, e2), respectively, where also eN,1 = e2.
The interesting point by looking at eS = (eS,1, e2) and eN = (eN,1, e2) is that the principal
needs to offer the same incentives to both naive and sophisticated individual-farmers at
the second period, but during the first period each type of a hyperbolic discounting agent
requires a different subsidy in order to provide e∗. More precisely, a sophisticated agent
has an incentive to adapt organic farming practices by e∗ under a price- decreasing
scheme p
S
=(p
S,1,p2), where pS,1 = e
∗δ−1β−2 > p2, whereas a naive agent requires a
price-constant scheme p
N
= (p
N,1, p2).
This difference on price requirements highlights that time itself does not necessarily
20The reader can find a complete derivation in the Appendix, section A
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increase the extent of the impact of dynamic inconsistencies on an agent’s decisions
regarding the provision of e∗. At each period, a j type individual-farmer creates a cost
for the principal equals DIj,t = pj,t−p . As a consequence, the presence of a naive agent
creates a cost for the policy-maker at period t equals DIN,t = pN,t − p, which remains
constant given that p
N,1 = p2 (DIN,1 = DIN,2). That is, the increase of the duration
of the contract by one period did not create more problems for the policy maker than
that she created in contracts with duration of one period. On the other hand, time itself
makes the presence of a sophisticated agent more problematic for the policy-maker. That
is,
DIS,1
DIS,2
= p
(1− β2
β2
)/
p
(1− β
β
)
=
1 + β
β
and it states that the increase of the duration of the contract by one period, increased
the cost for the principal of having sophisticated agents by (1 + β)/β.
Going back one more period (t = 0), an intretemporal time-inconsistent selfj-0 has
discounted present value of her net benefits from participating in the agreement:
DPVΠh0(e01, e02) =
2∑
t=1
βδt
[
− ψ(e0t) + (I + pe0t)δ
]
(3.8)
where e01 and e02 represents her plans for selfj-1’s and self -2’s actions, respectively.
At that point of time, a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer want to maxim-
ize (3.8), and therefore the first-order conditions w.r.t. e01 and e02, respectively are
ψ’(e01)=ψ’(e02)=pδ. In other words, a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer plans
to adapt to organic farming by the same degree at both two periods, and also by the
same degree with an exponential discounting individual-farmer. However, at that point
of time an individual-farmer is either naive or sophisticated, and therefore she believes
that selfj-1 and self -2 provide effort εj,01 = bje01 and εj,02 = bje02, respectively. In addi-
tion, we saw that selfj-1 is also either sophisticated or naive, and so that her optimal ef-
fort depends on her beliefs on self-2’s actual actions. As a consequence, e01 = εj,1 = bje2,
and so selfj-0 “considering” vector of efforts is εj,0 =
(
εj,01 = b2je2, εj,02 = bje02
)
.
Thus, an intertemporal time-inconsistent selfj-0 is willing to sign the contract if and
only if:
DPVΠh0(εj,0) ≥ DPV A
2∑
t=1
βδt
[
− ψ(εj,0t) + (I + pεj,0t)δ
]
≥ Aβδ2(1 + δ)
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p ≥ φj(2)
where φj(2) = φE
[
(1+δ)/(2bj(bj +δ)−b2j(bj2 +δ))
]1/2
is selfj-0’s opportunity cost when
the contract is of two-periods (T = 2).
The reader can easily verify that the increment of the duration of the contract by one
period did not affect the opportunity cost -and hence the incentive-rationality constraint-
for a naive individual-farmer (that is, for b = 1, φN(2) = φN(1) = φE). In addition, we
presented that once the contract begins a naive agent provides the same effort period
after period (eN,1 = e2), and that effort is the same with what she actually provides
in an one-period contracts. As a consequence, in case of a naive individual-farmer the
principal can simply impose a penalty d∗N = (d∗, d∗), and hence y2(e∗) = 〈p; d∗N〉 is the
incentive compatible contract. That is, at both y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉 and y2(e∗) = 〈p; d∗N〉
the policy-maker offers exactly the same incentives for the provision of e∗, and therefore
we could argue that when individual-farmers are unaware of their intertemporal time-
inconsistency of their decisions, time itself has zero impact for the policy-maker.
On the other hand, time itself affects both participation decision and actual effort to-
wards the adaptation to organic farming practices, making the design of a land use
contract more complex especially during the first periods of it. The reason is that when
T = 2, a sophisticated self-0 is willing to sign the contract if and only if p ≥ φS(2),
whereas for T = 1 she is willing to abandon her conventional farming practices (and
hence her income A) for a price p ≥ φS(1). However, we can show21 that φ(2) > φ(1),
and so the increase of the duration of the contact by one period, increased the oppor-
tunity cost for a sophisticated self -0. Furthermore, we also presented that sophisticated
optimal vector is eS = (eS,1, e2). Thus, the principal can motivate provision of e∗ either
by offering the incentive-compatible contract y2(e∗) = 〈p
S
≥ φS(2)〉, or he can im-
pose a commitment mechanism, in which the penalty vector is d∗S = (d∗1, d∗2), where
d∗1 = p(1 − β2)/β2 and d∗2 = p(1 − β)/β = d∗, and so a sophisticated agent provides e∗
under a pre-period subsidy p. Both p
S,1 and d
∗
1 are higher than p2 and d
∗
2, and therefore
we could say that time itself becomes an important factor into contract design.
To sum up, even though this two-periods theoretical analysis is too simple on its basis,
it yet provides us very interesting results on the impact of an intertemporal time-
inconsistent individual-farmer into contracts with duration more than one periods: (i)
in the absence of a commitment mechanism, the degree of self-awareness (i.e. the type
of a time-inconsistent decision-maker) determines not only who is going to sign the
21The reader can find a complete proof of this argument in the Appendix, at section C
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contract, but also the effort that a hyperbolic discounting agent exerts at t = 1; (ii)
as the duration of the contract increases, the opportunity cost and for a sophisticated
individual-farmer increases as well, whereas the opportunity cost for a naive remains the
same; (iii) once the contract begins, a naive individual-farmer provides the same effort
period after period. On the other hand, a sophisticated participant always increases
her actual performance period by period, and so she provides the targeted outcome if
a higher price/penalty is feasible during the first period of the contract; becomes more
costly than the provision of it at the more distant periods; (iv) given that the prin-
cipal perfectly knows the type of a time-inconsistent participant, he always offers either
yT (e∗) = 〈p; d∗j〉 or yT (e∗) = 〈pj〉, depends on whether a policy vector d∗j is feasible. If
the answer is yes, then the former contract is offered and the DI = 0, whereas if the
answer is no, then the latter contract is offered and DI = d∗j .
PROPOSITION 4: Let e∗ be the targeted outcome and p ≥ φE. Then:
a) if d ≥ d∗j is feasible, then y2(e∗) = 〈p; d∗j〉is the incentive-compatible contract for a j
type individual-farmer,
b) if d∗N ≤ d < d∗S and , then y2(e∗) = 〈p; d∗N〉is the incentive-compatible contract for
a naive agent, and y2(e∗) = 〈p
S
〉is the incentive-compatible contract for a sophisticated
agent, as long as p
S
≥ φS(2),
c) if d∗N approaches the infinity, then the incentive-compatible contract does not exist for
neither naive nor sophisticated individual-farmer
In the next chapter, we relax the assumption of perfect information and we analyse how
the behaviour of an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer deviates from that
of a time-consistent, when the principal can only observe her actions according to some
probability, but he still perfectly observes and verify her type, both one-period and two-
periods contracts. In other words, the purpose of the next chapter is to present the
consequences of both the informational and behavioural failures into contract design,
when the duration of such contract is both of one and two periods, respectively.
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Framework under Moral Hazard
What we have seen so far is that under perfect information, the presence of an inter-
temporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer does not necessarily imply that the policy-
maker needs to offer higher prices in order to motivate participation -in the first place-
and provision of the targeted outcome -in the second place. The extend of the impact of
dynamic inconsistencies are as the duration of the contract increases, depends on which
commitment mechanism is feasible. We saw that if d∗N ≤ d ≤ d∗S, then time itself has
zero impact into dynamic consistencies if and only if participants are naive, whereas if
d ≥ d∗S, then the principal offers y2(e∗) = 〈p; dS〉 without caring for the consistency of
individual-farmer’s time-preferences.
However, reality is more complex and it is usually the case where the Agricultural Agency
can observe and verify the actual effort of an individual-farmer only by some probability.
This information asymmetry -moral hazard-, provides an incentive to agents to behave
opportunistically. The most common way to overcome these opportunistic actions is
through monitoring techniques, which provide to the Agency the necessary information
on who complies and who cheats on the contract. For the sake of simplicity, we are going
to keep the same assumptions on the characteristics of the principal and of the agents,
respectively. In order to eliminate moral hazard, we assume that the principal performs
monitoring under which actual effort is observed and verified, and that monitoring is
complete in a sense that there is no possibility an agent who complies with the contract
to be detected of cheating and vice versa. In cases where agents detect of cheating, they
are penalized according to a specific penalty scheme. Let’s define as q the probability for
an individual-farmer to be detected of cheating on the contract, and Θ(e) = θ(e∗ − e),
is the penalty functon by which the principal penalizes the cheaters and 0 < θ ≤ θmax
is the marginal penalty which we assume that it cannot exceed a specific level due to
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technical, political and/or ethical boundaries associated with a very high penalty.
One interesting aspect of this framework under moral hazard is that e ∈ [0, e∗] does
not denote the effort itself, but rather reflects the degree of compliance with the tar-
geted outcome. Thus, we can define the strategy set for an individual-farmers as
Ω={e=e∗,e<e∗,e=0}, where the first term refers to full compliance (we refer to this
simply as compliance), the second term refers to partial compliance, and the third term
refers to full cheating (we refer to this simply as cheating). Therefore, compliance dom-
inates any other strategy if and only if it provides profits to an individual-farmer that
are greater than or equal to profits provided by any other strategy. In the literature
this condition is called incentive-compatibility constraint. When effort takes continuous
values in a predetermine interval, satisfaction of this constraint is equivalent with the
determination of the policy tools, under which compliance (i.e. the target) maximizes
agent’s expected profits.
As a consequence, the purpose of this chapter is to present the incentives that principal
must provide, in order -from one side- to motivate participation and -from the other
side- to make compliance towards the targeted outcome the dominant decision. Laffont
and Martimort (2009) define a contract that satisfies both these conditions as incentive
feasible. Therefore, we could say that the purpose of this chapter is to present the impact
of dynamic inconsistencies into incentive feasible contracts. Following again backward
analysis, we determine firstly the condition that make an one-period contract incentive
feasible for an exponential discounting individual-farmer, and after that we present how
these conditions differentiate when individual-farmers have intertemporal inconsistent
time-preferences. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to contracts with dur-
ation of two periods, in which we present the circumstances under which time itself
has a significant impact into decisions of an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-
farmer.
4.1 Individuals with Intertemporal Consistent Time-Preferences
Similar with the case of perfect information, the problem for the Agricultural Agency is
to determine these incentives that motivate an individual-farmer to comply with the tar-
geted degree of the adaptation to organic farming practices, provided that an individual-
farmer has already singed the contract at t = 0. At t = 1, the principal knows that
self -1’s discounted present value of her expected net benefits is:
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DPV E
[
Π1(e)
]
= (1− q)(−ψ(e) + (I + pe∗)δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected net benefits from not detect of cheating
+ q(−ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − θ(e∗ − e))δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected net benefits from detect of cheating
The first term on the right-hand side shows self -1’s expected net benefits from not get
caught cheating, whereas the second term on the right-hand side shows her expected net
benefits from get caught cheating. The above expression simplifies into:
DPV E
[
Π1(e)
]
= −ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e))δ (4.1)
A time-consistent self -1 chooses to adapt to organic farming practices by such degree
that maximizes (4.1). From the F.O.C. we obtain that ψ′(e) = qθδ, where given the
quadratic form of our cost function, ψ(e) = e2/2, self -1’s optimal degree to adaptation
to organic farming is:
e = qθδ
where e ≤ e∗ → qθ ≤ e∗δ−1. That is, e states that an exponential discounting self -1
chooses her degree of compliance towards the contract based on her expected marginal
cost of cheating. More precisely, given that the principal can detect cheaters (i.e. q > 0)
and penalises them (i.e. θ > 0), self -1’s optimal response to a policy (q, θ) varies
between full and partial compliance, whereas cheating becomes her optimal decision
only in cases where at least on of the policy tools (i.e. q and/or θ) equals zero. As
a consequence, the problem for the principal is to specify the condition under which
compliance becomes self -1’s dominant strategy. That is, an exponential discounting
individual-farmer chooses to comply with the contract (i.e. e = e∗), if her expected
marginal cost of cheating equals:
qθ = p
where as we have already seen p = e∗δ−1. That is, as long as the principal can impose a
policy (q, θ) such that the product of its components equals p, an exponential discounting
individual-farmer has no reason to not fully comply with the contract. Therefore, the
policy-maker chooses detection probability:
q = p
(1
θ
)
≡ f(θ)
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where f denotes principal’s policy function towards compliance with the contract. As a
consequence, self -1’s optimal response (ω∗E) to any policy function f is:
ω∗E =

{e∗} if q ≥ f(θ)
{e(θ, q)} if q < f(θ)
{0} if f(θ) = 0
However, the implementation of such policy (i.e. to detect by a probability f(θ)) does
not come at zero cost for the policy-maker. That is, the principal needs to spend a part
of his economic resources into monitoring in order to detect agents by a probability q.
Thus, the principal wants to impose the lowest possible detection probability and at
the same time to motivate compliance towards the contract. A closer look at f reveals
that if an infinite penalty is feasible, then detection probability approaches to zero, and
so the cost of monitoring approaches zero as well22. However, a really high penalty
is practically, politically and/or ethically infeasible, and so the principal chooses the
detection probability subject to θ ≤ θmax, where we assume that θmax reflects individual-
farmer’s tolerance towards penalization. That is, θmax ≡ θ∗, and so the policy-maker
chooses to impose a penalty θ = θ∗ and to detect by a probability q = f(θ∗), experiencing
with that way a cost of monitoring equals ξ(q). In addition, we can show the followings:
(a) θf ′(θ)/f(θ) = −1, where the left-hand side is the elasticity of the policy function
(ηe) to percentage changes of the penalty (θ)23. That is, ηe = −1 and it states that
for 1% increase (respectively decrease) of the penalty, the detection probability must be
decreased (respectively increased) by the same percentage, in order for compliance to
still be self -1 the dominant strategy. In other words, we could claim that the elasticity
of the policy function shows the trade-off between the policy tools q and θ,
(b) Given that q ∈ (0, 1), we can show that 24θ∗ ≷ d∗. That is, the penalty that the
principal imposes for eliminating the impact of moral hazard may exceeds the penalty
he needs to impose in order to overcome agent’s behavioural failures under perfect
information. Whether θ∗ > d∗ depends on the value of the present bias ratio (rβ).
Going back one period (t = 0) the principal knows that contract itself generates profits
for an agent equal DPV E
[
Π0(e)
]
= −ψ(e)δ + (I + pe∗ − c(e∗ − e))δ2, and so agent’s
22The reader can clarify the validity of this argument by considering that the limθ→∞ f(θ) = 0.
23The reader can find more details at section C, in the Appendix
24The reader can find a complete proof at section C in the Appendix.
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optimal strategy (i.e. the decision the degree of compliance towards the contract) is
e0 = arg maxeDPV E
[
Π0(e)
]
⇔ e0 = qθδ = e.
As a consequence, at any pair of policy tools set by the principal, an exponential dis-
counting self-0 is willing to sign the contract if and only if:
E[DPVΠ0(e0)] ≥ DPVΠ
−ψ(e0)δ + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e0))δ2 ≥ Aδ2
p ≥ φME (4.2a)
where φME = (A− I)/e∗+ qθ[2e∗− qθδ]/2e∗ is self-0 net opportunity cost for abandoning
her income from agricultural activities produced by conventional farming practices, and
hence inequality (4.2a) is self-0 incentive-rationality constraint (IRE)25.
As we have already discussed, principal’s optimal policy for the elimination of moral
hazard towards an exponential discounting individual-farmer is {θ∗, f(θ∗)}, and therefore
IRE becomes:
p ≥ φME (θ∗, q) (4.2b)
where φME (θ∗, q) = 2(A− I)/e∗ + e∗/2δ. If further we assume that the principal offer p,
then inequality (4.2b) converges to the ICCE (i.e. p ≥ φE). That is, an intertemporal
time-consistent individual-farmer is always willing to abandon her conventional farming
practices in the favour of a contract for the adaptation to e∗units of organic farming under
a subsidy of p, independently the information that principal has on her true actions.
In other words, the principal always offers p ≥ φE to intertemporal time-consistent
individual-farmers in order to motivate them to sign the contract, independently whether
moral hazard exists.
Now, we are ready to present our next proposition:
PROPOSITION 5 : Let e∗ be the targeted outcome, q ∈ (0, 1) is the detection probability
and 0 < θ ≤ θ∗ denotes the marginal penalty. Then, a contract y1(e∗) = 〈p; {θ∗, f(θ∗)}〉
is incentive-feasible for a time-consistent individual-farmer if and only if p ≥ φE.
25The reader must note that IRE = IRN , and so he (or she) can find a complete derivation of it by
having a look for the derivation of naive agent’s incentive-rationality constraint at section B on the
Appendix
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4.2 Individuals with Intertemporal Inconsistent Time-Preferences
Similarly with the case of exponential discounting individual-farmers, the problem for
the Agricultural Agency is to determine these incentives that motivate a hyperbolic
discounting agent to comply with the contract, provided that she has already singed the
contract at t = 0. Thus, at t = 1, an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer
has discounted present value of her net benefits:
DPV E
[
Πh1(e)
]
= (1− q)(−ψ(e) + (I + pe∗)βδ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected profits without monitoring
+ q(−ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − θ(e∗ − e))βδ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected profits with monitoring
which simplifies into
E
[
DPVΠh1(e)
]
= −ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e))βδ (4.3)
An intertemporal time-inconsistent self-1 chooses degree of compliance
e=arg maxeDPVE
[
Πh1(e)
]
, and so from the F.O.C. we have that ψ′(e) = qθβδ,
where given the quadratic form of our cost function, ψ(e) = e2/2, we finally have:
e = qθβδ
where 0 < e ≤ e∗ → qθ ≤ e∗(βδ)−1.
That is, given that q, θ > 0, a hyperbolic discounting self -1 never chooses to cheat on the
contract. Whether she fully or partially comply with it depends on her expected marginal
cost of cheating. Therefore, compliance (e = e∗) becomes the dominant strategy for a
hyperbolic discounting self -1 if:
qθ = p/β
were p = e∗δ−1. That is, as long as the principal can impose a policy (q, θ) such that
the product of its components equals p/β, a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer
has no reason to does not fully comply with the contract. Therefore, the policy-maker
chooses detection probability:
q = p
( 1
θβ
)
≡ fh(θ)
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where fh denotes principal’s policy function towards compliance with the contract. As
a consequence, self -1’s optimal response (ω∗H) to any policy function fh is:
ω∗H =

{e∗} if q ≥ fh(θ)
{e(θ, q)} if q < fh(θ)
{0} if fh(θ) = 0
In addition, fh has the following properties:
(a) ηh = ηe = −1. That is, fh has the same elasticity with f 26. In other words,
the presence of a time-inconsistent decision-maker does not affect the trade-off between
policy tools {q, θ}, and so percentage changes of the penalty leads to percentage changes
of detection probability which is independent from the consistency of agent’s decisions,
(b) fh = f/β, where given that β ∈ (0, 1), we have that fh(θ) > f(θ). That is, an
intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer requires a higher penalty than a time-
consistent individual-farmer in order to comply with the contract under the same penalty
θ,
(c) f(θ) < fh(θ) < 1, and therefore the penalty that the principal imposes to hyperbolic
discounting agents (θh) in order to overcome moral hazard is more likely to exceed the
penalty he imposes to overcome their behavioural failures than the penalty he imposes
to exponential discounting agents (θe) in order to overcome moral hazard. That is, the
sign of the inequality θh ≷ d∗ also depends on the value of rβ. In cases, however, where
the principal can impose θh > θe, this penalty is more likely to exceed d∗.
Going back one period (t = 0), an intertemporal time-inconsistent selfj-0 considers
the choice of participation. At that point of time, the discounted present value of
her expected profits from the contract is DPVE
[
Πh0(e)
]
=-ψ(e)βδ+(I+pe∗-qθ(e∗-e))βδ2,
and so selfj-0 plans to comply with the contract by the degree of eh0 =
arg maxeDPV E
[
Πh0(e)
]
. However, at that point of time an hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmer is either naive or sophisticated, and therefore her decision regarding
participation depends on her beliefs on whether self -1 is going to comply with the
contract by eh0. Thus, selfj-0 considers participation on the degree of compliance
εj = bjeh0, and so she chooses to participate if and only if
E[DPVΠh0(εj)] ≥ DPV A
26The reader can find a complete explanation at section C in the Appendix
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−ψ(εj)βδ + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − εj))βδ2 ≥ Aβδ2
p ≥ φMj (4.4a)
where φMj = (A − I)/e∗ + bjqθ[2e∗ − qθδ(2 − bj)]/2e∗ is selfj-0’s net opportunity cost,
and hence inequality (4.4a) is selfj-0’s incentive-rationality constraint (IRj).
Furthermore, the principal knows that once the contract begins, a hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmer complies with the contract under a policy {θ, fh(θ)}, and so inequality
(4.4a) becomes:
p ≥ φMj (θ, fh(θ)) (4.4b)
where φMj (θ, fh(θ)) = 2(A − I)/e∗ + e∗/2δ, and also φMj (θ, fh(θ)) = φME (θ, f(θ)), and
so That is, both an exponential discounting agent and a hyperbolic discounting agent
(both naive and sophisticated) have the same net opportunity cost, and hence they
require the same price in order to abandon their conventional farming practices and
to adapt to organic farming by the degree of e∗. Thus, if the principal offer p ≥ φE,
the both exponential and hyperbolic discounting agents are willing to sign the contract.
Therefore, we are ready to present our sixth proposition:
PROPOSITION 6: Let e∗ be the targeted outcome, q ∈ (0, 1) is the detection probability
and θ > 0 denotes the marginal penalty imposed to hyperbolic discounting agents. Then,
y1(e∗) = 〈p; {θ, fh(θ)}〉 is the incentive-feasible for any type j time-inconsistent decision-
maker if and only if p ≥ φE.
A brief conclusion from our so far analysis under imperfect information is that at the end
of the day, both naive and sophisticated individual-farmers behaves exactly the same,
in a sense that at any policy {θ, fh(θ)} they make the same plans over future degree
of compliance, they require the same price in order to sign the contract, and once the
contract begins they actually comply on the contract by the same degree.
However, there is a difference between naive and sophisticated agents regarding the
actual values of the penalty and of the detection probability. The reader can recall
that the maximum feasible penalty for an exponential discounting individual-farmer is
θ∗. However, there is nothing to indicate that a sophisticated individual-farmer has
necessarily the tolerance towards penalization (and hence the same θmax). It might
be the case where she has higher tolerance towards penalization than an exponential
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discounting, due to her self-awareness of the inconsistency of her decisions. If we use θ∗h
to denote the maximum feasible penalty for a sophisticated agent, then for the sake of
simplicity we assume that θ∗h = θ∗/β. Finally, let’s say that p ≥ φE, and so both selfN -0
and selfS-0 are willing to sign the contract.
At t = 0, the principal knows that a naive agent believes exactly the same with ex-
ponential discounting agents, and so they cannot accept a penalty higher than θ∗. In
that case, a naive agent complies with the contract under a policy {θ∗, fh(θ∗)}. On the
other hand, a sophisticated agent is aware of the intertemoral time-inconsistency of her
time-preferences and therefore she has higher tolerance towards penalization. In that
case, the principal can motivate compliance towards under a policy {θ∗h, fh(θ∗h)}.
A comparison between these two policies reveals that fh(θ∗) > fh(θ∗h) ∀β ∈ (0, 1). That
is, a naive agent requires a higher detection probability than a sophisticated agent, and
hence the presence of the former increases the economic resources that the policy-maker
needs to spend on monitoring. That is, even though both types of hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmers have the same policy function fh(θ), the presence of beliefs regarding
the consistency of their decisions determines the penalty that the policy-maker imposes
in order to motivate compliance towards the target, and hence beliefs determine the im-
pact of dynamic inconsistencies as it reflected in the cost of monitoring. More precisely,
one can easily verify that fh(θ∗h) = f(θ∗), and so the cost for the principal of having a
sophisticated agent is ξ
(
fh(θ∗h)
)
− ξ
(
f(θ∗)
)
= 0. On the other hand, fh(θ∗) > f(θ∗) and
therefore the presence of a naive agent creates a cost for the principal equals
DIM ≡ ξ
(
fh(θ∗)
)
− ξ
(
f(θ∗)
)
=
p
θ∗
(1− β
β
)
In other words, the impact of dynamic inconsistencies into contract design when moral
hazard also exists (DIM) equals
DIM =
DI
θ∗
=
d∗
βθ∗h
given that θ∗h = θ∗/β.
PROPOSITION 7: The presence of different beliefs regarding the consistency of an
agent’s decisions will determine the impact of a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer
into contract design when moral hazard exists. More precisely,
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a) If an agent is naive, then {θ∗, fh(θ∗)} is the optimal policy, which creates a cost to
the principal equals DIM ,
b) If an agent is sophisticated, then {θ∗h, fh(θ∗h)} is the optimal policy, which creates zero
cost to the principal.
The interesting point is that, the principal does not necessarily needs to detect naive
agent with the higher probability fh(θ∗). In cases where participants are unaware of
their intertemporal inconsistency of their decisions, the policy maker can always impose a
policy {θ∗, f(θ∗)}, allowing to them to partially comply on the contract begins. However,
at t = 0 a naive agent behaves of being an exponential discounting individual-farmer,
and therefore she falsely believes that under such policy scheme, self -1 is going to comply
with the contract. Thus, the principal needs to overcompensate her, in a sense that he
needs to offer a subsidy that corresponds to compliance (i.e. p ≥ φE) for a degree that
corresponds to partial compliance. As a consequence, principal’s decision on whether to
impose the policy {θ∗, f(θ∗)} or {θ∗, fh(θ∗)} to a naive hyperbolic discounting individual-
farmer is determined by:
ξ(fh(θ∗)) ≤ [U(e∗)− U(βe∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility loss
(4.5)
That is, the Agricultural Agency has an incentive to bear the cost associated with the
higher monitoring if and only such cost does not exceed principal’s utility loss by allowing
to naive individual-farmer to partially comply with the contract.
In this section of our theoretical analysis we developed our framework for the adaption of
a predetermine degree to organic farming practices under imperfect information, when
the contractual agreement between the Agricultural Agency and individual-farmers is of
one period. Our key finding is that the presence of a hyperbolic discounting individual-
farmer does not necessarily creates serious problems for the policy-maker, as this prob-
lems are reflected into monitoring costs. Given that the principal can always impose
a policy {θ∗, f(θ∗)} the impact of dynamic inconsistencies determines exclusively by
the principal’s ability to observe and identify the beliefs of an hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmer regarding the consistency of her time-preferences.
However, when the duration of such contracts are more than one periods, participants
either choose to play the same strategy every period or they may choose to play a
different strategies depending on the time period. For this reason, the next part of this
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section is dedicated to present both the impact of time itself and dynamic inconsistencies
into contract with moral hazard.
4.3 A Two-Periods Theoretical Framework under Imperfect
Information
In the previous section we presented how hyperbolic discounting agents affects contracts
for the provision of agri-environmental goods and services under imperfect information
and when the duration of such contract is only for one period. Here, we are going to relax
this assumption by expanding time horizon into two periods (T = 2), keeping at the
same time all the other assumptions and simplifications constant. For the same reasons
as we explained in two-periods contracts under perfect information, our analysis concerns
only the incentives under which a two-periods contract becomes incentive-feasible for an
intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer.
When the policy-maker offers a two-period contract, participants have a set of strategies
Ω2, which does not necessarily consist by the same strategies period after period. As
a consequence, the problem for the him is to determine the incentive-feasible contract
for an j type intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-farmer, by choosing a menu of
policies which are consisted by penalties θj,t and detection probabilities q = fj,t(θ), and
so the principal imposes the policy vector Fj =
(
{θ, fj,1(θ)}; {θ, fj,2(θ)}
)
.
The stages of this two-periods framework with moral hazard can be presented by figure
4, where at t = 0 the principal offers the contract, at period t = 1 participants choose
current and future strategies, from which current actions will be observed and verified
at the next period. At t = 2, individuals choose again their new actions, which in turn
will be observed and verified when contract ends (t = 3). Thus, we obtain the incentive-
feasible contract by solving the intertemporal game between the principal and selfj-t
backwards.
At t = 2, both sophisticated and naive individual-farmers have discounted present value
of their expected net benefits:
DPV E
[
Πh2(e)
]
= −ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e))βδ (4.6)
One can easily observe that (4.6) is identical with (4.3). Hence, an intertemporal time-
inconsistent self-2 exerts effort e2 = qθβδ = e, and so compliance becomes her dominant
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strategy under a policy function {θ, fj,2(θ)}, where fj,2(θ) = fh(θ) = p/βθ.
Going one period back (t = 1), an intertemporal time-inconsistent selfj-1 has discounted
present value of expected her net benefits
DPV E
[
Πh1(e1, e2)
]
= −ψ(e1) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e1))βδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
current effort
−ψ(e2)βδ + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e2))βδ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
future effort
(4.7)
where e2 denotes selfj-1 plans for future effort. That is, (4.7) states that selfj-1 expected
profits depend not only on her current degree of compliance, but also on what self -2 is
going to do. Therefore, maximizing (4.7) with respect to both e1 and e2 we obtain the
optimal conditions ψ′(e1) = qθβδ and ψ′(e2) = qθδ, respectively, which in turn provides
the optimal relationship between current and future degree of compliance towards the
contract: e1 = βe2. However, at that point of time an individual-farmer is either aware
or unaware of her intertemporal time-inconsistency of her decisions, and so she has
different beliefs up to which point her current plans (that is, e2) actually carried out by
self -2. Thus, selfj-1 does not choose her optimal strategy directly on e2, but rather
on another effort that takes into account her beliefs regarding self -2 actions. Using εj,1
to denote such effort, we have that εj,1 = bje2. Thus, a selfj-1’s optimal strategy is
ej,1 = βbje2, which in turn becomes
ej,1 =
qθδβ if j = Nqθδβ2 if j = S
As a consequence, a selfN -1 complies with the contract under a policy {θ, fN,1(θ)},
where fN,1(θ) = fj,2(θ), whereas a sophisticated agent complies with the contract under
a policy {θ, fS,1(θ)}, where fS,1(θ) = p/θβ2. As a consequence, the principal offers the
policy vector FS =
(
{θ, fS,1(θ)}; {θ, fS,2(θ)}
)
and FN =
(
{θ, fN,1(θ)}; {θ, fN,2(θ)}
)
to
a sophisticated and to naive agent, respectively in order to motivate compliance at every
period.
4.3.1 The Impact of Time into j-Type Optimal Strategies
When contracts expand to more than one periods, dynamic inconsistency reveals
some interesting aspects of individual-farmer’s behaviour: (i) we can easily verify that
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eN,1>eS,1 ∀β(0,1). That is, selfN -1 is willing to do more (and hence to comply more)
than a selfS-1 at any possible pair of (θ, f(θ)); (ii) eN,1 = e2, and so an unaware in-
tertemporal time-inconsistent decision-maker plays the same strategy over compliance
among periods, once the contract begins; (iii) in contrast with naive optimal decisions,
a sophisticated agent has the tendency to comply more as times approaches the end
of the contract (eS,1 < e2). In addition, given that her optimal effort takes continu-
ous values, a sophisticated decision-maker never plays the same strategy period after
period, unless the policy vector FS is feasible. We can present these results by consid-
ering the following scenarios, in which the principal chooses the policy function fj,t(θ),
(i.e. the detection probability that enforces participants to comply with the contract)
which will be imposed at every period t, and agent’s optimal strategy set is defined as
ω∗j = {ej,1, e2} ⊂ Ω2 :
(a) the principal imposes a policy function f(θ) = p/θ at every period:
Once the contract begins, an unaware individual-farmer exerts effort e1,N = e2, and so
both selfN -1 and self-2 choose to partially comply with the contract at t = 1 and t = 2,
respectively. In addition, an aware participant also chooses to partially comply with
the contract at both periods, but the effort she provides at t = 1 is lower than that of
selfN -1’s. That is, selfS-1chooses to comply by the degree of eS,1 = β2e∗ < eN,1 = βe∗.
Thus, optimal strategy sets for a naive and a sophisticated individual-farmer under such
policy scheme is
ω∗N = {βe∗, βe∗} and ω∗S = {β2e∗, βe∗}
respectively,
(b) the principal imposes a policy function fN,1(θ) = fj,2(θ) = p/βθ at every period:
In that case, an unaware individual-farmer exerts effort e1,N = e2, and so both selfN -1
and self-2 comply with the contract at every period. On the other hand, an aware
participant exerts effort equals eS,1 and e2 at t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. Thus, her
best response to such policy function is to partial comply at the first period, but she
finds optimal to comply at the second one. Thus, optimal strategy sets for a naive and
a sophisticated individual-farmer under such policy scheme is
ω∗N = {e∗, e∗} and ω∗S = {βe∗, e∗}
respectively,
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(c) the principal imposes a policy function fS,1(θ) = p/β2θ at the first period and
fj,2(θ)=p/βθ at the second period:
Here, both naive and sophisticated individual-farmers comply with the contract at every
period. The reason is that eN,1, e2 ≤ e∗, and so any for any detection probability
q ≥ fj,2(θ) a naive agent has an incentive to comply with the contract. In addition, we
can easily verify that under a detection probability q = fS,1(θ) a sophisticated self -1
finds optimal to comply at the first period (i.e. eS,1(fS,1(θ) = e∗). Moreover, we saw that
a sophisticated agent, also complies with the contract at t = 2 under a policy function
fj,2(θ). Thus, optimal strategy sets for a naive and a sophisticated individual-farmer
under such scheme is:
ω∗N = {e∗, e∗} and ω∗S = {e∗, e∗}
respectively,
The above three different scenarios regarding the policy functions (i.e. detection probab-
ilities) that the principal chooses to impose in order to motivate a hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmer to comply with the contract at every period highlight an important
result: When it comes to actual degrees of compliance towards the contract, time itself
has zero impact into compliance decisions for a naive agent, since for a given policy
function she chooses the same degree of compliance at every period. On the other hand,
if agents are sophisticated, then the total duration of the contract affects her decisions
over the pre-period degree of compliance, since a sophisticated agent has the tendency
to comply less during the first period of the contract. In other words, we could say
that time itself has zero impact into naive agent’s decisions towards compliance with
the contract.
4.3.2 The Impact of Time into Participation Decisions
Going back one period (t = 0) , a time-inconsistent selfj-0 does not need to exert any
effort at all. The only decision she needs to take is whether participation is profitable for
her. At that point of time, selfj-0 discounted present value of her expected net benefits
is
DPV E
[
Πh0(e01, e02)] =
2∑
t=1
βδt[−ψ(e0t) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e0t))δ] (4.8)
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and so she plans to comply at t = 1 and t = 2 by ψ′(e01) = ψ′(e02) = qθδ. However, at
that point of time an individual-farmer is either naive or sophisticated, and thus a hy-
perbolic discounting self -0 has different beliefs on whether such plans actually fulfilled
by selfj-1 and self -2, respectively. In addition, we saw that selfj-1 either sophistic-
ated or naive, and therefore selfj-1 has different beliefs regarding the consistency of
her plans with self -2 actual actions. Thus, selfj-0’s pre-period “believed” efforts are
εj=(b2je2,bje02), where e2 = e02. Since the principal can perfectly observe the type of
a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer, he has no interest of imposing a different
policy vector than FS or FN , when agents are sophisticated or naive, respectively. Thus,
a hyperbolic discounting selfj-0 signs the contract if and only if
E
[
DPVΠh0
(
e∗, e∗
)]
≥ DPV A
2∑
t=1
(
− ψ(e∗)βδt + (I + pe∗)βδt+1
)
≥ Aβδ2(1 + δ)
p ≥ 2(A− I)/e∗ + e∗/2δ (4.9)
That is, inequality (4.9) is selfj-0 incentive-rationality constraint, and for p = p it is
given by p ≥ φE. In other words, both in one-period and in two-periods contract, the
principal needs to “secure” that a pre-period subsidy such that p ≥ φE is feasible, and so
we could conclude that time itself has zero impact into participation decisions, provided
that the policy-maker can observe and identify the type of a hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmer, and hence to impose the necessary policy vector Fj.
4.3.3 The Impact of Beliefs into Two-Periods Contracts
Suppose that p ≥ φE is satisfied, and so both naive and sophisticated individual-farmers
sign the contract at t = 0. In addition, let’s recall that the maximum feasible penalty
for a j type intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-maker is
θ
max
N ≡ θmaxE = θ∗ if j = N
θmaxS = θ∗h if j = S
At t = 0 the principal knows the type of a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer,
and hence he can impose either FS or FN . However, neither of such policy vectors come
at zero cost for the policy-maker. The reason lies again on different beliefs that naive
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and sophisticated agents have at that point of time. More precisely, a selfN -0 behaves
exactly the same with an exponential discounting individual-farmer, and so the principal
cannot impose to him a penalty higher than θ∗. As a consequence, the policy-maker can
motivate compliance towards the contract if at every period he can bear the cost of
monitoring ξ
(
fh(θ∗)
)
. On the other hand, a sophisticated agent also creates a cost for
the principal. The reason is that at t = 1, the maximum penalty that the principal
can impose is θ∗h, and therefore he needs to bear the cost for motivating sophisticated
agent to comply with the contract by imposing a detection probability fS,1(θ∗h), which
is higher than that in one-period contract (fS,1(θ∗h) > f(θ∗h)). However, this cost does
not hold fo too long, since at the next period the policy-maker can shift it to the side
of participants by imposing again a penalty θ∗h, but now a lower detection probability
fS,2(θ∗h). As a consequence, a sophisticated hyperbolic discounting decision-maker has
strong incentives to report of being naive, and hence she enforces the principal to bear
entirely the cost of compliance both at two periods.
In conclusion, this dynamic analysis under moral hazard highlights that: (i) time itself
has zero impact into participation decisions for both naive and sophisticated individual-
farmers, and hence the principal always offer p ≥ φE, independently the consistency of an
agent’s decisions; (ii) the degree of self-awareness (i.e. beliefs) determine optimal efforts
(and hence strategies) during the first period of the contract, and so the Agricultural
Agency does not necessarily impose the same policy vector to both sophisticated and
naive participants; (iii) time itself matters only for sophisticated individual-farmers,
since the degree of compliance during the first periods becomes lower and lower as the
duration of the contract increases, and so the higher is the duration of the contract,
the higher is the detection probability (i.e. the higher is the policy function) that the
policy-maker needs to impose in order to motivate compliance towards the contract; (iv)
the impact of an intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-maker into contract design -as
it reflected in monitoring costs- is determined by her beliefs at t = 0, and hence by which
penalty the principal can impose;
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Chapter 5
Does Inter-Temporal Time-Inconsistency Matters?
5.1 A Discussion of the Results
The purpose of this dissertation was to present the impact of an intertemporal time-
inconsistent decision-maker into contract design for the provision of agri-environmental
goods and services, under perfect and imperfect information, respectively.
Unfortunately, we cannot give a straight answer on whether hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmers creates serious problems for the policy-maker. What we can say for
sure, is that their impact depends on her beliefs regarding the intertemporal consistency
of their time-preferences and the duration of the contract, both when the Environmental
Agency has perfect and imperfect information on their true actions.
More precisely, we proved that under perfect information27:
(a) Both a time-consistent and a time-inconsistent decision-maker (naive and sophist-
icated) make the same plans for future the future,
(b) If T = 1, then both a naive and a sophisticated individual-farmer exert the same
effort once the contract begins. If, however, T > 1 (e.g. T = 2 ) then, a naive
individual-farmer always provide more effort in the first period than a sophisticated,
but the latter always increases her performance in the second one, whereas the
performance of the former remains the same,
(c) An unaware individual-farmer has lower opportunity cost than an aware individual-
farmer (φN < φS), and so participation of the former does not necessarily implies
that the latter will also abandon her conventional agricultural activities in favour
27These results hold for both one-period and two-period contracts, unless it specifies different.
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of the contract, but the opposite always holds. In addition, we presented that the
opportunity cost for a sophisticated participant increases as the duration of the
contract increases (φS(2) > φS(1)), but the opportunity cost of a naive participant
remains unaffected,
(d) Results (b) and (c) states that under perfect information time itself matters only
for sophisticated individual-farmers,
(e) The Environmental Agency can overcome the problems of a hyperbolic discounting
decision-maker by imposing a commitment mechanism, which its value depends on
the present bias ratio ((1 − β)/β). The higher is the degree of present bias (i.e.
low values of β), the stricter (i.e. higher value) is the commitment mechanism,
(f) The impact of a hyperbolic discounting decision-maker depends on whether a pen-
alty d∗ is feasible. In one-period contracts if d ≥ d∗, then a contract y1(e∗) = 〈p; d∗〉
is incentive compatible for both naive and sophisticated individual-farmers. In that
case, their presence creates zero problems for the policy-maker, whereas in any
other case the principal pays entirely the cost of their presence (DI). On the
other hand, in a two-periods contracts the situation is more complex, since the
beliefs of the participant determines which of the penalty vectors d∗S or d∗N the
policy-maker imposes, and hence which is the impact of an intertemporal time-
inconsistent decision-maker into contract design,
(g) The above result states that when the principal perfectly observes the actions
of the participants and T = 1, then beliefs do not matter for the policy-maker.
As long as T increases, the higher is the role of beliefs for the determination of
the consequences of intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-makers into contract
design,
However, it is more realistic to consider situations where the principal has limited in-
formation on the degree in which participants actually comply with the contract. Due to
this information asymmetry, the penalty that the principal imposes does not only try to
solve agents’ strategic actions, but also to eliminate problems that individual-farmer’s
behavioural failures creates into contract design.
More precisely, we proved that when moral hazard exists28:
(a) Under imperfect information, both planned and actual strategies depend on par-
ticipant’s expected marginal cost of cheating, and hence on which policy function
28Again, these results hold for T ≥ 1, unless it specifies differently
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the Environmental Agency imposes,
(b) For T ≥ 1, the type of a time-inconsistent decision-maker determines the impact of
dynamic inconsistencies, since a naive agent requires a higher detection probability
than a sophisticated agent,
(c) Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent individual-farmers plan to play the
same strategy (i.e. to provide the same effort) at t = 0, and both naive and
sophisticated participants comply by the same degree once the contract begins,
(d) Intertemporal time-inconsistency of an individual decisions does not affect the
trade-off between the policy tools for the elimination of moral hazard,
(e) Since strategies (i.e. efforts) for both exponential and hyperbolic discounting
decision-makers do not depend on the price, the principal needs to ensure that
the targeted outcome itself generates profits to participants that are least equal to
profits from conventional agricultural activities. Hence, the Environmental offers
the same price to everyone, which it equals to the price for the provision of e∗
under perfect information,
(f) Result (e) states that for T ≥ 1, dynamic inconsistencies affect only compliance
conditions, and so its consequences for the policy-makers reflect in the values of
the policy tools that the principal must implement,
(g) The existence of maximum ethical penalties implies that even when T = 1, the
identification of selfj-0 beliefs matters because the principal might need to ap-
ply different penalty (or detection probability) between naive and sophisticated
individual-farmers. In other words, beliefs determine the impact of dynamic in-
consistencies under moral hazard even for one-period contracts,
(h) When T > 1, then naive agents do not have necessarily the same optimal strategy
set with sophisticated agents. What we presented in this dissertation is that in
dynamic contracts, naive have the tendency to comply more during the first periods
of the contract, and this decision over the degree of compliance remains the same
throughout T . In other words, the optimal strategy set for an unaware individual-
farmer consists by the same pre-period strategy. On the other hand, the optimal
strategy set for a sophisticated individual-farmer consists of different strategies,
unless a decreasing policy vector FS is feasible,
(i) The above results imply highlight that time itself matters only for aware inter-
temporal time-inconsistent decision-makers. We also saw that the higher is the
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duration of the contract, the higher is the tendency for a sophisticated agent to
cheat during the first period of the contract, and hence the cost of their presence
into contract design increases as the duration of the contract increases,
The main result that comes straightforward from this brief presentation of our key find-
ings between perfect and imperfect information is that hyperbolic discounting individual-
farmers do not necessarily create serious problems for the policy-maker, independently
how symmetric is the information that the Environmental Agency has on participant
actual performance. What we say for sure is that individua-farmer’s beliefs regarding
the intertemporal consistency of her time-preferences, the existence of maximum feas-
iblel penalties, and the duration of the contract are the key factors that determines the
impact of dynamic inconsistencies into contract design.
The reason is that both under perfect and imperfect information beliefs determine actual
performance during the first period of the contract (i.e. when T > 1) and participation
decisions (under perfect information, when also T ≥ 1).
If for the sake of simplicity we take as granted that an intertemporal time-inconsistent
decision-maker signs the contract, then the problem for the Agency is to specify the
penalty scheme that motivates either provision of the targeted outcome (perfect inform-
ation) or compliance (imperfect information) with it. Whether such policy scheme is
feasible depends on whether its value exceed the maximum ethical penalty for a hyper-
bolic discounting decision-maker.
However, we saw that not every type of intertemporal time-incosistent individual-farmers
have necessarily the same maximum tolerance levels towards penalization, and hence
not every type creates the same problems for the policy-makers. That is, beliefs provide
the necessary information on the principal on which is the maximum penalty he can
impose to every type of hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer, and hence to determine
whether the presence of a j types creates problems for the policy-maker.
If we extend the duration of the contract to more than one periods, then the role of the
maximum feasible penalty -and hence of beliefs- becomes even crucial, because sophist-
icated agents requires even a higher penalty in the beginning of the contract in order to
provide (or to comply with) the targeted outcome.
However, the importance of the time itself is so high relative to beliefs. The validity
of this argument lies on the assumptions of our theoretical framework, and more pre-
cisely on the assumption that both planned and actual effort take continues values in
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an interval [0, e∗], instead of between two values {0, e∗}, as it is the case in many the-
oretical frameworks that analyse the impact of moral hazard into contract design (e.g
Fraser (2002, 2012, 2004); Choe and Fraser (1999); Heyes (2000); Hölmstrom (1979)).
As a consequence, for any T ≥ 1 the principal can impose d∗(or fh(θ) under imper-
fect information) at every period, allowing to sophisticated agents to under provide (or
partially comply with) the targeted outcome. In that case, we could claim that time
itself is a minor factor into contract design for the provision of an (agri)environmental
outcome.
Another implication of the assumption of continues effort is that one could argue that
in cases where (agri)environmental policy is not a priority, then the principal can al-
ways offer exactly the same contract to both exponential and hyperbolic discounting
individual-farmers, obtaining from the latter a positive outcome that can be interpreted
as second-best outcome. Thus, intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-makers do not
make moral hazard even a more serious problem.
We favour this argument in the context that beliefs determine the consequences of dy-
namic inconsistencies into contract design, and so when (agri)environmental policy is
a top priority for the Environmental Agency, then principal economic resources must
primarily spend in the identification of the beliefs of an intertemporal time-inconsistent
decision-maker, rather than in these resources (i.e. monitoring expenses) that makes
compliance her dominant strategy. In other words, we favour the claim that adverse
selection on the type of an intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-maker seems to cre-
ate more serious problems for the principal, rather than the problems that moral hazard
creates by itself.
5.2 Problems and Areas for Further Research
In this dissertation we tried to analyse the impact of dynamic inconsistencies into
(agri)environmental contracts, in which the principal delegates to participants the pro-
vision of a predetermine target, under a compensation scheme.
In our framework, we assume that participants are individuals, whose the primary source
of income comes from conventional agricultural activities, and hence every single indi-
vidual needs to provide the target. However, one might argue that in reality the provision
of an (agri)environmental target is too costly for a single person. Instead, farmers have
the tendency to organise in unions and the delegation is between the principal and the
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union. In that case, the union as a form of an institution, behaves consistently, and
hence its choices over provision (or compliance) are the same at any point of time. As
a consequence, dynamic inconsistencies of individula decisions are “irrelevant” when it
comes to (agri)environmental policy.
Another problem that might arise is that non every individual-farmer has the same
degree of present bias, and the assumption that individuals lack of self-learning processes
from previous actions is unrealistic. Thus, an naive agent may becomes sophisticated
somewhere in between the duration of the contract.
A third opposition to our theoretical analysis could on the assumption that e∗ is the per-
period outcome. One could claim that in cases where individuals have all the necessary
means to provide the targeted outcome by themselves, however they may not provide
it every single period. In other words, a more realistic approach could to assume that
e∗ is the cumulative targeted outcome. Even though such modification has zero impact
into one-period contracts, it might have serious implications in multi-periods contracts,
even in cases where participants are naive.
A fourth “drawback” of our theoretical analysis is that we internally assume that actual
effort of an individual does not affect -either positive or negative- the utility of another
individual, who may not participate in the agreement. In other words, in this dissertation
we do not take into account neither positive nor negative externalities of participant
actual performance. However, many agri-environmental targets have spatial implication
-even in cases where they concern the use and development of a land that is privately
owned-, and so these must also be included into the frame.
Finally, in our frame both compensation and penalty schemes (i.e. both commitment
mechanism and the penalty for cheating) are expressed in monetary terms. However,
individual-farmers may be positive intrigue towards environmental protection, and there-
fore the implementation of a mix policy with non-monetary (i.e. certificates) and mon-
etary incentives may provide to the principal a more efficient solution to the problem of
behavioural failures.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Closing this dissertation, one needs take into consideration that our purpose was not
to present a theoretical framework that captures all the parameters that might affect
individual’s decision-processes, but rather to emphasize on the incentives that a dy-
namic inconsistencies individual requires in order to provide (or comply) a predefine
(agri)environmental target, and how these incentives differentiate relative to the clas-
sical assumption that individual’s decisions are intertemporal consistent.
In the introduction we stated that “... our purpose is to provide a reliable answer on
how agricultural contracts for the adaptation to organic farming practices should be
designed when dynamic inconsistencies on participant decisions and moral hazard ex-
ists?”. Our main key finding is that when the policy-maker has perfect information
on participants actual action, the policy-maker either offers a higher price or he im-
poses a commitment mechanism. The choice between these two alternatives depends
on the feasibility of a commitment mechanism, independently the duration of the con-
tract. However, when contracts extend to more than one periods, someone’s belies
regarding her self-awareness on the consistency of her decisions becomes a major factor,
because they indicate to the policy-maker the value of the commitment mechanism. As
a consequence, the policy-makers ability to perfectly observe and verify the type of a
hyperbolic discounting decision-maker is the factor that determines the extent of the
impact of dynamic inconsistencies into multi-period contracts.
Similar result holds when the principal can only observe and verify participant’s actions
by some probability. However, information asymmetry on agent’s performance indicates
that beliefs becomes an important factor, even for when contracts are of one period.
Even though beliefs do not determine optimal strategies, they -however- determine the
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penalty that the policy-maker can impose, and hence the detection probability, which in
turn will show the impact of a dynamic inconsistent individual-farmer. The need for the
identification of beliefs becomes even higher when the duration of the contract extend to
multiple periods. In that case, a sophisticated participant has the tendency to comply
lower and lower during the first periods as T increases. The implication is that if we
assume that T is high enough, then compliance during the first periods becomes too
costly for the principal, since the probability of monitoring becomes too high and hence,
the cost of monitoring increases as well. As a consequence, it is reasonable to argue
that when participants are sophisticated and T approaches to infinity, incentive-feasible
contracts do not exists for such type of individual-farmers, since the cost of monitoring
during the first periods approaches the infinity.
To sum up, we claim that in cases where penalties are restricted to some maximum value
and the principal cannot perfectly observe and verify participants actions, the impact of
dynamic inconsistencies into contract design depends on whether the principal can also
perfectly observe and verify the type of an intertemporal time-inconsistent individual-
farmer, and hence he can identify participant’s beliefs regarding the consistency of their
time-preferences. That is, the intertemporal consistency of someone’s decisions is of high
importance for the policy-maker only in cases where the policy-maker cannot perfectly
observe and verify the type of a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer. The less
information on participant’s actual action the policy-maker has, the higher is the need
for him to identify the type of a participants. In other words, moral hazard creates
serious failures into (agri)environmental contract design up to that point in which adverse
selection on the type of a participant also exists.
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Appendix A
Derivation of Optimal Efforts
The reader must have two important things in mind: (1) The convnexity of our cost
function implies that profits are a concave function in the level of effort. Thus, given
that profits are also increasing function in the level of effort, the steady-state point will
maximize our profit function; (2) In addition, the introduction of penalty scheme (both
under perfect and imperfect information) is a linear function in the level of effort. As
a consequence, it does not affect the concavity of our profit function, making the effort
that derives from the first-order condition the maximum; (3) hyperbolic and exponential
discounting individual-farmers have similar profits, where the only difference lies on the
discounting function. Therefore, we are going to derive optimal efforts under a general
discount function D(t).
A.1 One-Period Contracts
A.1.1 Perfect Information
At every period, an individual-farmer chooses effort that maximizes her discounted
present value of her net benefits. Given that efforts at t = 0 denotes individual’s plans,
we can focus our derivation exclusively at t = 1. Thus, self-1 has:
DPVΠ(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe)D(1), where D(1) is the discount function used by her at
t = 1.
From the first-order condition (F.O.C.) we have that:
dDPV pi1(e)/de = −ψ′(e) + pD(1) = 0 ⇒ ψ′(e) = pD(1), which given the quadratic
form of our cost function. ψ(e) = e2/2, we have that e = pD(1)
i
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Recall that for t > 1, time-consistent individual-farmer discount function is DE = δt,
whereas time-inconsistent discount function is DH = βδt, and so g the former chooses
optimal effort e = pδ, whereas the latter chooses optimal effort e = pβδ.
A.1.1.1 Derivation of optimal commitment mechanism
The reader can recall that the commitment mechanism has the following scheme
P (e) =
 0 if e = e
∗
d(eh0 − e) if < e∗
, where d > 0
At t = 0, the Agency offers p = e∗δ−1, and so at t = 1, a time-inconsistent self-1 has
discounted present value of net benefits:
DPVΠh1(e) = −ψ(e) + (I + pe− d(e∗ − e))βδ.
The F.O.C. is
dDPV pih1(e)/de = −ψ′(e) + (pe + d)βδ = 0⇒ ψ′(e) = (p+ d)βδ
where again given the quadratic form of our cost function ψ(e) = e2/2, self-1 chooses
effort e = (p+ d)βδ.
Thus, self-1 provides the targeted outcome if
e∗ = (p+ d)βδ ⇒ e∗(βδ)−1 = p+ d⇒ d = e∗(βδ)−1 − p
d = p(β−1 − 1)⇒ d∗ = p(1− β)/β
A.1.2 Imperfect Information
The reader can recall that the Agency penalizes cheaters according to the following
penalty scheme
Θ(e) =
 0 if e = e
∗
θ(e∗ − e) if < e∗
, where θ > 0
At t = 1 the expected discounted present value of self-1’s net benefits is
DPV E[Π(e)] = −ψ(e) + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − e))D(1)
From the first-order condition (F.O.C.) we have that
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dDPV E[Π(e)]/de = −ψ′(e) + qθD(1) = 0⇒ ψ′(e) = qθD(1)
Given DE = δt, DH = βδt, and ψ(e) = e2/2, an exponential discounting individual-
farmer exerts effort e = qθδ, whereas a hyperbolic discounting individual-farmer exerts
effort e = qθβδ.
A.2 Two-Periods Contract (only for hyperbolic discounting
agents)
A.2.1 Perfect Information
At t = 1, an intertemporal time-inconsistent self-1 has discounted present value of her
net benefits:
DPVΠh1(e1, e2) = −ψ(e1) + (I + pe1)βδ − ψ(e2)βδ + (I + pe2)βδ2
From the first-order conditions (F.O.C.) we have that:
∂DPVΠh1/∂e1 = −ψ′(e1) + pβδ = 0⇒ ψ′(e1) = pβδ
and
∂DPVΠh1/∂e2 = −ψ′(e2) + pδ = 0⇒ ψ′(e2) = pδ
where given that ψ(e) = e2/2, we finally obtain e1 = pβδ and e2 = pδ, respectively.
As a consequence, the optimal relationship between current effort and future plans is
e1 = βe2.
A.2.2 Imperfect Information
Again, the Agency penalizes cheaters according to the following penalty scheme
Θ(e) =
 0 if e = e
∗
θ(e∗ − e) if < e∗
, where θ > 0
At t = 1, a time-inconsistent self-1 has
DPV E[Πh1(e1, e2)] = −ψ(e1) + (I + pe∗− qθ(e∗− e1))βδ−ψ(e2)βδ+ (I + pe∗− qθ(e∗−
e2))βδ2
iii
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where again e2 denotes self-1 plans for the future.
From the first-order conditions (F.O.C.) we have that
∂DPV E[Πh1]/∂e1 = −ψ′(e1) + qθβδ = 0⇒ ψ′(e1) = qθβδ
and
∂DPV E[Πh1]/∂e2 = −ψ′(e2) + qθδ = 0⇒ ψ′(e2) = qθδ
and so given that ψ(e) = e2/2, we have e1 = qθβδ and e2 = qθδ, respectively.
As a consequence, the optimal relationship between current effort and future plans is
e1 = βe2.
iv
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Appendix B
Derivation of Incentive-Rationality Constraints (IR)
The reader must note that at t = 0, a naive agent behaves exactly the same with an
intertemporal time-consistent decision-maker, and so the IR of the latter will be the
same with IR of the former. Therefore, we are going to derive the incentive-rationality
constraint only for a j type intertemporal time-inconsistent decision-maker.
B.1 Perfect Information
B.1.1 Time-inconsistent Individual-Farmers in an One-Period Contract
At t = 0, selfj-0 ”considering” effort is εj = bjpδ, and so her incentive-rationality
constraint is
DPVΠh0(εj) ≥ DPV A
−ψ(εj)βδ + (I + pεj)βδ2 ≥ Aβδ2 ⇒ −ψ(εj) + pεjδ ≥ δ(A− I)
−(pbjδ)2/2 + bj(pδ)2 ≥ δ(A− I)⇒ −(pbjδ)2 + 2bj(pδ)2 ≥ 2δ(A− I)
bj(pδ)2(−bj + 2) ≥ 2δ(A− I)⇒ p2bjδ(2− bj) ≥ 2(A− I)
p2 ≥ 2(A− I)/bjδ(2− bj)⇒ p ≥
[
2(A− I)/bjδ(2− bj)
]1/2
and so,
IRj =
p ≥
[
2(A− I)/δ
]1/2
j = N
p ≥
[
2(A− I)/βδ(2− β)
]1/2
j = S
v
B.1. PERFECT INFORMATION
B.1.2 Time-inconsistent Individual-Farmers in a Two-Periods Contract
At t = 0 an inter-temporal time-inconsistent decision-maker signs the contract if and
only if
DPVΠh0(ε01,j, ε02,j) ≥ DPV A ⇒ −ψ(ε01,j)βδ + (I + pε01,j)βδ2 − ψ(ε02,j)βδ2 + (I +
pε02,j)βδ3 ≥ Aβδ2(1 + δ)
−ψ(ε01,j) + (I + pε01,j)δ − ψ(ε02,j)δ + (I + pε02,j)δ2 ≥ Aδ(1 + δ)
−ψ(ε01,j)− ψ(ε02,j)δ + pε01,jδ + pε02,jδ2 ≥ δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
However, ε01,j = b2je02 and ε02,j = bje02, and so we can express the former as a function
of the latter as follows: ε01,j = bjε02,j.
Thus, incentive-rationality constraint becomes:
−b2jψ(ε02,j)− ψ(ε02,j)δ + pδbjε02,j + pε02,jδ2 ≥ δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
−ψ(ε02,j)(b2j + δ) + pδε02,j(bj + δ) ≥ δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
−(bjpδ)2(b2j + δ)/2 + (pδ)2bj(bj + δ) ≥ δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
−(bjpδ)2(b2j + δ) + 2(pδ)2bj(bj + δ) ≥ 2δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
(pδ)2bj[2(bj + δ)− bj(b2j + δ)] ≥ 2δ(1 + δ)(A− I)
p2 ≥ 2(1 + δ)(A− I)/δbj[2(bj + δ)− bj(b2j + δ)]
p ≥
[
2(1 + δ)(A− I)/δbj[2(bj + δ)− bj(b2j + δ)]
]1/2
However, φN = φE =
[
2(A− I)/δ
]1/2
, and so
φS(2) = φN
[
(1 + δ)/bj
(
2(bj + δ)− bj(b2j + δ)
)]1/2
B.1.3 Incentive-rationality Constraint under Imperfect Information
DPV E[Π0(εj)] ≥ DPV A
−ψ(εj)δ + (I + pe∗ − qθ(e∗ − εj))δ2 ≥ Aδ2
pe∗δ ≥ (A− I)δ + ψ(εj) + qθδ(e∗ − εj)
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(IR)
However, given the quadratic form of our cost function, the the right-hand side can be
written as
(A− I)δ + ε2j/2 + qθδ(e∗ − εj) = (A− I)δ + b2je20/2 + e0(e∗ − bje0)
(A− I)δ + b2je20/2 + e0e∗ − bje20 = (A− I)δ + bje20(bj/2− 1) + e0e∗
(A− I)δ + bje0[e0(−2 + bj)/2 + e∗]
and so,
pe∗δ ≥ (A− I)δ + bje0[e0(−2 + bj)/2 + e∗]
p ≥ (A− I)/e∗ + bje0[e0(bj − 2) + 2e∗]/2e∗δ
p ≥ (A− I)/e∗ + bjqθ[2e∗ − qθδ(2− bj)]/2e∗
Therefore, for a naive agent (bN = 1)
p ≥ (A− I)/e∗ + qθ/δ − (qθ)2δ/2e∗
whereas for a sophisticated agent (bS = β)
p ≥ (A− I)/e∗ + βqθ[2e∗ − qθδ(2− β)]/2e∗
and so, given that the principal can identify the type of a participant, he imposes either
fh(θ) or f(θ), and so incentive-rationality constraint for both these two policy functions
becomes
pe∗ ≥ (A− I) +−ψ(e∗)δ−1 + qθ(e∗ − e∗)
pe∗ ≥ (A− I) + (e∗)2/2δ
p ≥ (A− I)/e∗ + e∗/2δ
vii
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More Proofs and Derivations
A Comparison Between φN(1) and φS(1)
Recall that φN(1) =
(
2(A− I)/δ
)1/2
and φS(1) =
(
2(A− I)/βδ(2− β)
)1/2
Then,
φN(1)/φS(1) =
[
(2(A− I)/δ)
/
(2(A− I)/βδ(2− β))
]1/2
φN(1)/φS(1) = [β(2− β)]1/2
Let’s assume that
[β(2− β)]1/2 < 1⇒β(2− β) < 1
β2 − 2β + 1 > 0⇒ (β − 1)2 > 0which is true for all β ∈ (0, 1)
Hence,
φN(1)/φS(1) < 1⇒ φN(1) < φS(1)
Comparison Between φS(1) and φS(2)
Recall that φS(1) = φN
[
1/β(2−β)
]1/2
and φS(2)=φN
[
(1+δ)/(2β(β+δ)-β2(β2+δ))
]1/2
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Thus,
φS(1)/φS(2) = φN
[
1/β(2− β)
]1/2/
φN
[
(1 + δ)/(2β(β + δ)− β2(β2 + δ))
]1/2
φS(1)/φS(2) =
[
(2β(β + δ)− β2(β2 + δ))
/
β(2− β)(1 + δ)
]1/2
Let’s assume that the
[
φS(1)/φS(2)
]
< 1, and so
[
(2β(β + δ)− β2(β2 + δ))
]1/2
<
[
β(2− β)(1 + δ)
]1/2
2β(β + δ)− β2(β2 + δ) < β(2− β)(1 + δ)
2β2 + 2βδ − β4 − β2δ < 2β − β2 + 2βδ − β2δ ⇒ β4 − 3β2 + 2β < 0
β4 − 3β2 + 2β > 0⇒ β(β3 − 3β + 2) > 0
Given that β ∈ (0, 1), then the 3rd degree polynomial must positive. Thus,
β3 − 3β + 2 = β3 − 2β − β + 2 = β(β2 − 1)− 2(β − 1) = β(β + 1)(β − 1)− 2(β − 1)
(β − 1)(β(β + 1)− 2) = (β − 1)(β2 + β − 2)
Hence,
β2 + β − 2 = β2 − 1 + (β − 1) = (β − 1)(β + 1 + 1) = (β − 1)(β + 2)
Finally, we have that
β(β3 − 3β + 2) = β(β − 1)(β2 + β − 2) = β(β − 1)2(β + 2) > 0 ∀β ∈ (0, 1)
As a consequence,
The assumption that
[
φS(1)/φS(2)
]
< 1 is true, and hence φS(1) < φS(2)
A Comparison Between φMN (1) and φMS (1)
ix
Recall that φMN (1) = (A − I)/e∗ + qθ[2e∗ − qθδ]/2e∗ and
φMS (1)=(A-I)/e∗+βqθ[2e∗-qθδ(2-β)]/2e∗
Then,
φMN − φMS = [qθ(1− β)− δ(qθ)2(1− β(2− β))]/2e∗
φMN − φMS = qθ[(1− β)− qθδ(1− β)2]/2e∗
φMN − φMS = qθ(1− β)[1− qθδ(1− β)]/2e∗
Thus, φMN ≷ φMS depends on whether 1− qθδ(1− β) ≷ 0
If 1− qθδ(1− β) > 0, then
1 > e0(1− β)⇒ e0 < 1/(1− β)
If 1− qθδ(1− β) < 0, then
1 < e0(1− β)⇒ e0 > 1/(1− β) > 1
However, this is wrong since e0 ∈ [o, e∗] and e∗ ∈ [0, 1]
Derivation of the elasticity of the policy functions f and fh
The reader can recall that f(θ) = p/θ and fh(θ) = p/βθ. In addition, the elasticity of
a policy function for an exponential and a hyperbolic discounting agent is defined as
ηe = θf ′(θ)/f(θ) and ηh = θf ′h(θ)/fh(θ), respectively.
Thus, the elasticity of f(θ) is:
θf ′(θ)/f(θ) = (−p/θ2)(θ/(p/θ))
ηe = (−p/θ2)(θ2/p)⇒ ηe = −1
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whereas the elasticity of fh(θ) is
θf ′h(θ)/fh(θ) = (−p/βθ2)(θ/(p/βθ))
ηh = (−p/βθ2)(βθ2/p)⇒ ηh = −1
Relationship Between d∗ and θ∗
The principal imposes a policy function q ≡ f(θ∗) = p/θ∗
However, q ∈ (0, 1), and so
f(θ∗) < 1⇒ p < θ∗ ⇒ prβ < θ∗rβ, where rβ = (1− β)/β > 1
Thus,
d∗ < θ∗rβ ⇒ θ∗/d∗ > rβ
As a consequence:
if rβ > 1, then θ∗ > d∗
if rβ < 1, then θ∗ ≷ d∗ depending on the value of β.
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